THE ARYAN PATH

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June 1967

NAMRATĀ
The Door of Dream

ROBERT POWELL
The Free Mind

PAUL HOSSFELD
Knowledge and Practical Philosophy

G. NAGESWARA RAO
T. S. Eliot's Use of the Upanishad

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however dimly and lost among the host —
as does the Evening Star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and
lost among the host — as does the evening star
to those who tread their path in darkness.

— *The Voice of the Silence*

VOL. XXXVIII JUNE 1967 No. 6

The Door of Dream

. . . it is not physical science that we can ever ask to read man for us, as the riddle of the Past, or that of the Future; since no philosopher is able to tell us even what man is, as he is known both to physiology and psychology. In doubt whether man was "a god or beast," he is now connected with the latter and derived from an animal. No doubt that the care of analysing and classifying the human being as a *terrestrial animal* may be left to science, which occultists — of all men — regard with veneration and respect. They recognize its ground and the wonderful work by it, the progress achieved in physiology, and even — to a degree — in biology. But man's *inner,* spiritual, psychic, or even moral, nature cannot be left to the tender mercies of an ingrained materialism; for not even the higher psychological philosophy of the West is able, in its present incompleteness and tendency towards a decided agnosticism, to do justice to the inner; especially to his higher capacities and perceptions, and those states of consciousness, across the road to which such authorities as Mill draw a strong line, saying "So far, and no farther shalt thou go."

—H. P. BLAVATSKY

There are only two strictly logical views of life: one, a false one, which understands life to mean those visible phenomena that recur in our bodies from the time of birth to the time of death; the other, a true one, which understands life to be the invisible consciousness which dwells within us. ... We must remind ourselves as often as possible that our true life is not this external material life that passes before our eyes here on earth, but that it is the inner life of our spirit, for which the visible life serves only as a scaffolding ... . Life is only what I am conscious of in myself ... . When I am most conscious of it, I feel that — I AM — never beginning anywhere, never ending anywhere ... . My life manifests itself in time and space, but that is only its manifestation. Life itself, as I am conscious of it, is something I perceive apart from time and space ... .

—LEO TOLSTOY

> They [the Western psychologists] do not know what was known ages ago, and what is known to some today, that the Ego, the man, the thinker, is more fully occupied, more his real self, during the dreamless slumber of the body than at any other time ... . When the body sleeps, the real man is most active, with the greatest degree of intelligence, but thinking and acting on another plane altogether, in a different state altogether, from any known to us in ordinary waking human existence.
>
> —ROBERT CROSBIE

THE NIGHT'S JOURNEY into sleep is being explored today through the latest technological methods and their appliances. The exploration follows the pattern of inductive and experimental science and utilizes all possible means to record objectively the findings of this attempt to probe into the consciousness of the sleeper.

While the interest of modern science in the subject of dreams is undoubtedly due to Sigmund Freud and his book *The Interpretation of Dreams,* still regarded as a classic in the field, modern dream research originated in 1952 at the University of Chicago. It was there that the first objective indicators of the dream state were devised. Today there are actually scores of research centres in different countries of the world where such experiments are being conducted. They are designated "dream laboratories" and the best-known are in Britain, France, the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

An up-to-date laboratory provides small cubicles, each with a bed, buzzers, a telephone, tape-recorders, etc. And adjoining each is a "control room" equipped with recording instruments — the electrical machine which registers the brain's electrical waves and all available scientific gadgets. A new terminology has been evolved and includes such abbreviations as REM (rapid eye movements).

The volunteer sleeper submits himself to elaborate preparations. Electrodes connected to the recording machine are pasted to his skull. A tube-like pneumongraph around the chest records the rate of respiration. Other electrodes pasted to the chest indicate the heart rate. Further gadgets register the muscular tension and the bodily movements. Stomach tubes indicate the secretion of gastric juices, and catheters in fraction collectors, the secretion of hormones. In fact, no physiological function is left out. The wonder is how the sleeper can sleep at all! In any case, his sleep is repeatedly interrupted during the night; for the monitor wakes him from the control room to have him relate his dreams.

Man is thus reduced to a mere physiological unit and submitted to most humiliating observations. The researcher or monitor, at the sacrifice of his own sleep, is on duty the whole of the night. He is sustained by

the false belief that all these objective findings will reveal the why and the how of the dream state. How vain and how childish appear such methods in the light of the wisdom of our ancient forefathers!

Says the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*:

> The Spirit of man has two dwelling-places: both this world and the other world. The borderland between them is the third, the land of dreams. While he lingers in the borderland, the Spirit of man beholds both his dwellings, both this world and the other world. And according as his advance is in the other world, gaining that advance the Spirit of man sees evils or delights ... .
>
> Leaving the bodily world through the door of dream, the sleepless Spirit views the sleeping powers. Then clothed in radiance, returns to his own home, the gold-gleaming Genius, swan of everlasting.
>
> Guarding the nest beneath through the life-breath, the Spirit of man rises immortal above the nest. He soars immortal according to his desire, the gold-gleaming Genius, swan of everlasting.

The modern researcher tells us that he is anxious to understand man and to know what goes on inside the body when that body is asleep. He speaks of the psychological factor and admits the need to study the data he gathers, regretting there has been no time as yet to do more than observe and record. But we learn of similar experiments being conducted with animals, especially with cats, and these findings also are used in the interpretation of the sleep and the dreams of humans. One can only conclude that man is regarded as an animal, more evolved no doubt than the feline creature, but still only an animal.

And yet these researchers themselves acknowledge they are not any nearer to the solving of the questions they have set out to answer. Some confess that the recent findings in the dream laboratories have made for greater confusion and bewilderment. Should not this added confusion and puzzlement lead them to the conclusion that their method is basically wrong and that they are attempting the impossible — that purely external and objective data pertaining to the physical body, by their very nature, cannot provide an explanation of the subjective phenomena of dreams? Surely they should accept defeat and seek elsewhere for the meaning of the sleep of the body and of the dream state?

As against the bewildering maze of all these findings on the physical plane, how clear and logical are the explanations offered by ancient psychology as evidenced in the quotation from one of the old Upaniṣads given above! The key to the mystery of Man lies in the recognition that he is not a mere animal, but a God. Yes, there is a living God within the physical body and that God is a Genius and a

Seer and dreams true "dreams," far beyond the ordinary dream state or *Svapna*. The mechanistic devices of the dream laboratories may register the bodily changes produced by dreams at the lowest level, the causes of which are physiological and sensuous. And indeed the mechanisms of these experiments must cause such distortions of the subject's dream state that one wonders what validity is left in the observations. But they will ever fail to register "dreams" at the spiritual level; for these take place in *Sushupti* beyond dreamland. The only means of interpreting the experiences in the *Sushupti* or "dreamless" state is through the spiritual intuition of the "interpreter"! For it is *Buddhi,* the Spiritual Soul, which is the direct cause of the *Sushupti* condition, leading to the *Turiya* state, the highest state of *Samādhi*.

Or to put it in another way. Man has a dual consciousness in addition to that of his normal waking state or *Jagrat*. One aspect lies below the threshold of the *Jagrat* state. The other lies above. The one below or *Svapna* gives rise to dreams of the ordinary type, the only ones which can affect the sleeping body and bring about the changes observed and recorded by modern research. The *Svapna* state is truly the *sub*-conscious, below the conscious mind. But there is a higher realm above that of the normal threshold, pertaining to the *super*-conscious or higher Mind. Modern research admits the existence of a dreamless state, but believes it is a blank negation, a cessation of all thinking and feeling. Ancient philosophy affirms that dreamless sleep, beyond the dream state, is one of intense spiritual activity of higher ideation, and pertains altogether to a transcendent state. It is there that we experience intimations of immortality, there that spiritual instructions are received and problems solved. *Sushupti* alone explains prophetic dreams, warning dreams, and retrospective dreams and justifies the numerous thinkers who have affirmed down the ages that we are more than ourselves in sleep and that the slumber of the body enables the Soul to awaken and to act freely. Cats and other animals dream, but their dreams belong to the level of instinct. For them there can be no *Sushupti* state because there is no individualized *Buddhi* or spiritual Soul to produce it.

Thus true "dreams" or the visions of *Sushupti* during the sleep of the body will never be understood unless the existence of a Higher Self in man is recognized. That is the real Man, the permanent and immortal Ego, and his normal state is "dreamless" because it is beyond the personal consciousness. All men experience this state of *Sushupti* during the sleep of their bodies, when they have passed through the door of dream beyond the *Svapna* state; but alas! most people are unable to bring back the memory on resuming waking life.

The subject is one of tremendous importance; for by living according to the dictates of the Soul it is possible to remember in *Jagrat* the experiences of *Sushupti*. The first step is the recognition that the Immortal Ego is the Spirit in man, a beam of light immaculate, a ray of the Universal Soul, a gold-gleaming Genius, Swan of everlasting. That beam is our life-guide and our true Self. May its divine radiance illuminate and guide us!

NAMRATĀ

THE DAILY WAKING LIFE is but a penance and the trial of the body, so that *it* too may thereby acquire the right condition. In dreams we see the truth and taste the joys of heaven. In waking life it is ours to gradually distil that dew into our normal consciousness.

—W. Q. JUDGE

I LIKE TO THINK that in dreams we catch glimpses of a life larger than our own. We see it as a little child, or as a savage who visits a civilized nation. Thoughts are imparted to us far above our ordinary thinking. Feelings nobler and wiser than any we have known thrill us between heartbeats. For one fleeting night a princelier nature captures us and we become as great as our aspirations.

—HELEN KELLER

ROBERT POWELL

The Free Mind

[Readers may remember the interesting essay on "Some Reflections on Causality" by Dr. Robert Powell, PH.D., D.I.C. In this article he explores the limits of ratiocinative thinking and of the empirical self, and represents meditation as a means of freeing the mind from them.—ED.]

This world is by nature composed of disjointed parts. It is held together by cause and effect like loose sand by a clenched fist.

—ASHVAGHOSHA

NOT LONG AGO an anguished letter appeared in the correspondence columns of the London *Daily Telegraph* in which the writer was much perturbed by the fact that somebody had succeeded in accurately foretelling the outcome of a number of matches in the recent football World Cup Final held in London. The clairvoyant concerned had afforded indisputable proof of his prediction by depositing before the events the results inside a sealed envelope with a disinterested party. This true prognostication, our correspondent maintained, necessitated a revolution in his outlook on life, which however he found it extremely painful to make. What worried him particularly in this connection was that his cherished notions of virtue and sin now had to go by the board. For how could there be such things at all, if everything was predetermined anyway, and the choice which one was going to make between "good" and "evil" was already foreordained? Would this not make a mockery of the whole concept of personal responsibility?

In a previous article* we began to look into the matter of causality and discovered an aspect of it that might be described as puzzling, like any paradox which is not immediately understood in its origin. But however interesting that aspect in itself, we did not on that occasion touch upon the really vital issue, the problem of Freedom and its evident negation by causality — rightly perceived by our newspaper correspondent as an extremely disturbing question even if for the wrong reason — which alone is of the utmost importance.

In trying to resolve this predicament many thinkers, especially in the West, have looked for a kind of compromise and sought to reconcile free will with precognition, without however squarely facing the inherent contradiction which this would entail. One way of explaining (away) this contradiction has been to suggest that what is foreseen is merely a trend, a possibility, but not the actual event itself; and that the individual has

* "Some Reflections on Causality," THE ARYAN PATH, March 1967, p. 114

still room for manoeuvre in acceding to or eluding the trend. This, of course, leaves free will intact but, it seems to me, does not hold water in the following cases: where the event is highly improbable, the odds against its happening being of astronomical magnitude; and where the prognosticator provides a great number of, perhaps irrelevant, details which are afterwards verified.

Generally speaking, the conclusion is shirked that precognition implies an ineluctable determinism. To this purpose some commentators even adduce the paradox implied in causality which we discussed in the previous article. They argue that since events merely follow one another in a regular sequence but without apparent inner necessity, freedom is not invalidated. For a typical example of this reasoning, see the article on "Free Will and Precognition" in *Chambers's Encyclopaedia* (George Newnes Ltd., London, 1959).

Are we then mere automatons, victims of circumstances beyond our control, and so doomed to live for ever in sorrow and confusion? Or, notwithstanding all appearances to the contrary, is there yet a way of life which is not "fated," not mechanical, not meaningless, but creative from moment to moment, and so cutting us free from such incidentals as birth and upbringing?

The iron hand of causality rules everywhere in the known world and, it is assumed by most scientists, everywhere in the universe. On the material level it characterizes the repetitive, inflexible nature of phenomena. For example, each time I bring sodium and water in contact with each other, an explosive reaction follows. This repetitiveness applies also to the sphere of living things — an acorn will always develop into an oak and not, say, into an elm; a tadpole is ever to become a frog, etc. — illustrating the determinism of conditioned origination. Therefore, causality obviously represents limitation, specialization — which is the very essence of determinism. But going one step further, we see all this occurring also on the psychological plane, within the type of consciousness we know: because the mind always revolves around its past experiences, all so-called new experience is in essence a mere repetition of an old experience with some modifications, the reappearance of an old pattern of thought and action. Thus all we know, and will ever know, is a continuity from the old, i.e., a variation on the known; and the Unknown is always to remain just that.

Without causality — the bond of time — all this would not and could not be. It is therefore true to say not only that Aśvaghoṣa's "clenched fist" (quoted at the head of this article) holds the disjointed parts of nature together but also that it has set the universe in motion. Perhaps it would

be more accurate to say that it keeps the universe moving. After the "parts" have come into being (that is, if they have not always been there; for to talk of creation is already speculation).

Our main concern in this enquiry is the realm of the psyche and here the leading question is: What is the working principle behind the "clenched fist" which by imposition of the tyrannical rule of causality restrains the mind, prevents it from attaining its freedom? Has not Aśvaghoṣa very appropriately used the symbol for "grasping" in his analogy, and so given us a clue? Is it not grasping — that is, desire not understood — which binds us to the past, keeps us unaware of the totality of life, so that each action which the mind sponsors is incomplete, wishing to complete itself in further action?

A complete action never leaves a trace; but an incomplete action, springing from an unfulfilled desire, from a thought not totally digested, ever leads to more thought, to a repetition of the experience, to further "busyness" — the urge to find fulfilment at some future time. An unresolved problem recurs again and again as thought, thus giving continuity to the mind's agitation. So basically the trouble lies in our lack of awareness, in not going to the full depth of experience, in our superficial and shallow living — in our abysmal ignorance of the basic thought processes that drive us and "give direction" to (i.e., determine) our lives.

Thus the mind is for ever mulling over the past, without, however, being able to dissolve it. At the same time, owing to this continuity of thought, there never is any possibility of perceiving the present untainted by the past. Our situation is that to every challenge we respond from the background of experience, our conditioning, which thus becomes the limiting factor in our dealings with life. Every inadequate response then leaves a further residue around which thought crystallizes — and so on, in an endless progression.

Most readers will probably know that in physics and mathematics a point in space is located by its co-ordinates in reference to a system of three mutually perpendicular axes or surfaces which intersect in one point of origin; that is, the position of the first point is completely determined, fixed, by three numbers representing the distances to each of the reference planes. The co-ordinate system may have been erected entirely arbitrarily, or perhaps with mathematical convenience in mind; it may have been anchored to the earth or to the solar system in a certain orientation. Whatever may be the case, the essential thing here is that, by virtue of making it serve as a reference base, we have endowed the system with some kind of absoluteness which in reality it does not have. Consequently, this quality of absoluteness is conveyed also to the point in question. (It

was only with the advent of Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity that scientists began to realize there is no such thing as an absolute frame of reference in which to pin down phenomena in the physical universe.)

Now, it seems to me that, when we come to examine how a particular thought is related to its associated thoughts and to time, the simple geometrical reference system described above may in several ways act as a helpful analogy. Consciousness may be visualized as an ever-expanding three-dimensional network, the strands of which are made up of thoughts flowing into one another by association. A thought in the present is surrounded by associated thought and patterns of thought, all of the past, from which it has sprung.

Any thought (like the geometrical point) has reality only in so far as it relates to its matrix; but the same also applies to the matrix, which itself is the result of earlier conceptual patterns, and so on — in a regression through time to the earliest imprint, the primeval conditioning, in man's consciousness. Just as a point in space, unrelated to any other geometrical entities, has no mathematical significance, so a particular thought on its own, out of the context of social thinking, isolated from the network of thought, has no meaning; it is merely a link in the chain of determinants enforcing causality in the psyche. From this it also follows that thought can never produce a single statement which formulates the whole truth, such statement always needing further qualification. The truth can therefore never be verbalized, presented piecemeal, as an abstraction; and it can be visualized only when there is a vision of totality in which the particular is viewed from the universal (the latter representing the frame of reference, capable of infinite expansion) and not vice versa. The reader may note how we have arrived at the same insight as that expressed in Nāgārjuna's paradox in the dialectic of his Mādhyamika, viz., that any statement, however profound, can be controverted and that the truth can only emerge from a process of continual and total negation (the reader is further referred to his teaching of *Śūnyatā*, the Void, already briefly discussed in our previous article in this journal).

With the thought-structure as described above also originates the concept of our separateness; first physically and then, flowing from it through a process of identification, also psychologically. This psychological space-time world view constituting the ego is kept alive and strengthened by a continual crystallization of thought patterns as memory, containing all the experiences — the insults as well as the flatteries — which have left a mark on the mind and represent the total impact of the "outside world" on our self-projected separateness. Since it is thought that has created the "I," it is also this very same thought that forms a perpetual threat to

the latter's existence; and it is only thought that can defend the artificial entity (or, so thought purports) against the onslaught of the facts that deny, that ignore, the life of the ego. Contrary to what is widely held, there is ever a large — and unbridgeable — gap between thought and fact; there is no such thing as objective thought. Thought can never come to terms with the fact, the present, since on account of its inherent nature (which is grounded in memory, the past) it is always referring back to that past, to other thought equally subjective. Yet, despite this lack of solid basis, we trust entirely to thought, which to us is terribly important: we hold opinions, have views and beliefs, with a determination as fixed as though we were dealing with facts. And as long as we are doing this, we are out of touch with Life.

Each thought is engendered and determined within a framework of thought-constructs, both collective and individual (but it is also thought that is making this distinction). If we are a little observant, we shall be able to prove this to ourselves and see that any thought occurring in the present is only a repetition, a continuation of previous thought activity; and we shall also perceive how the thought fits into an ideational pattern of the past, of our experience, our established outlook on life. Because the mind is for ever in this state of recognition, it never lives wholly in the present. No new fact is ever observed as standing on its own, afresh, when the observation would be made and forgotten, but it is immediately referred back to, and viewed in the light of, the reference system of the "I," giving new life to that "I." Hence any new experience is only partially understood (total understanding can only be outside any reference system) — understood from a particular point of view only. This leaves a residue, a quantum of "conditioning," which is filed away, fitted into the self's frame of reference. Thus comes into being the ever increasing network of thought, of knowledge with a purely psychological bearing, which is the burden we carry with us in memory.

It is through these complicated and subtle processes that thought, although it has the illusory quality of standing on its own, of "absoluteness," is always dependent upon past activity, and in this it not only obeys the law of causality but is the very medium by and in which causality is enacted. Strictly speaking, therefore, we are not individuals, because the mind is not truly independent; and the patterns of thought that shape our individualities, which we think are uniquely our own, are derived from the patterns of collective consciousness. Understanding the origin of individual consciousness, we see this as an abstraction, a narrowing down from within collective consciousness.

Just as the point in space is given some semblance of absolute reality

by the frame of reference within which it is suspended — without this co-ordinate system it would be completely indeterminate — so each thought is given the appearance of reality by the supporting network of thought-constructs — experience, attitudes, and "knowledge" — within which it was erected. Resulting entirely from this existing structure, each new thought and experience is completely determinate.

And again, as with our point in space, if we take away the referents — that is, question the validity of the old that has produced the present — the whole structure collapses: we are completely insecure, but also the mind is outside space and time!

To expose this network of thought patterns, and to wipe it away completely, all the bonds that tie us to the past and together constitute the past — the *only* past — is meditation, a great unburdening and cleansing of the mind. But this network must be tackled in its totality. To stop anywhere abruptly is not meditation but introspection or psychoanalysis. It leaves the past intact, and does not bring into being Freedom.

ROBERT POWELL

The Lesser Witness

Why should the minor poet sing,
when greater-gifted lords of song,
who share with gods the magic voice,
pour out in rich and mellow notes
the music of each hidden thing?

Why does the tiny daisy raise
its snowy head above the green,
when in the woods and gardens near
are flowers of wondrous size and hue
to stun the sense with speechless praise?

Vexed is the intellect in vain —
Life courses through her several ways,
and mind its various tributes brings:
It matters that the thought be true,
the vision clear of evil stain.

WILLIAM EWART WALKER

M. S. R. ANJANEYULU

The Buddha and Upanisadic Thought

[Shri M. S. R. Anjaneyulu, M.A., is a young writer from Andhra whose devotion is to Cleo, the Muse of History. In this essay, he notes the continuities from Upaniṣadic thought to the Buddha's teaching and the special emphases of the Buddha's method of teaching and spiritual guidance.—ED.]

WITH his profound mind and observing nature, a critical and creative genius and philosophic outlook, with an incomparable tenderness, dignified with a calm and collected personality, engrossed in an ardent desire to reach and teach the masses, the Buddha made a religion of philosophy and a way of life of metaphysical insight. In accomplishing this lifelong vocation, the Buddha was affected by the all-pervading influence of Upaniṣadic thought on the culture and spirit he inherited. What the new teacher had to say was already, in germ, in the Upaniṣads. "Many of the doctrines of the Upaniṣads are no doubt pure Buddhism, or rather Buddhism is on many points the consistent carrying out of the principle laid down in the Upaniṣad."[1] His life and his teaching are proof of this. A comparative study of Upaniṣadic thought and early Buddhist thought would bring this out.

There is nothing new in the Buddha's *Mahābhiniṣkramaṇa* (Great Departure) from amidst complete happiness; nothing novel in his feeling of weariness at the succession of days of temporal happiness; nothing startling about his renunciation to seek everlasting bliss: nothing new, we say, in the sense that it was a common practice among thoughtful people in those days. In his search for the truth, before he discovered his own method, the Buddha followed the various methods that were in vogue in those days. When he attained the supreme knowledge, what he taught was not alien to the thought of the day. There may be some difference of emphasis but we find that the thinking pattern of the Buddha and the basic principles of early Buddhism are akin to Upaniṣadic thought. The Buddha did not regard himself as an innovator but only as a restorer of an ancient way, long obscured. It was the same path that the Upaniṣads had taught.

> To develop his theory Buddha had only to rid the Upaniṣads of their inconsistent compromises with Vedic polytheism and religion, set aside the transcendental aspect as being indemonstrable to thought and unnecessary to words and emphasize the ethical universalism of the Upaniṣads.[2]

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[1] MAX MULLER: *Sacred Books of the East*, XV. 27 (Introduction)

[2] S. RADHAKRISHNAN: *Indian Philosophy* (Ch. VII), I. 360

With the Upaniṣads, he emphasized that everything in this world is full of sorrow, "*sarvam duḥkham, duḥkham,*" and that everything that exists is fleeting and transitory, "*sarvam kṣaṇikam, kṣaṇikam*" (*anicca*). Thus the Buddha was at one with the holy sages and *ṛṣis* of Vedic and Upaniṣadic fame in the conception of life as a dream.

Both the Buddha and the Upaniṣads questioned the authority of the Vedas. Both attacked the mechanical theory of sacrifices and ritualistic superficialities. After the Buddha's time the sacrificial system, though it did not die, never regained its old prestige. Both stressed that man cannot release himself from rebirth either by performing sacrifices or by practising penance. This deliverance is only possible when he attains to perfection of truth and masters the knowledge of reality. With the Upaniṣads he insists that the man of pure life is on the road to salvation from rebirth. With them he offers to all moral ideals suited to their attainments and position. The feeling that this life is suffering and release from rebirth is that which man always longs for is accepted by both. The Upaniṣads urge us to feel the transitoriness of life and exhort us to get rid of its temporal attractions. The Buddha, too, sees *Tṛṣṇā,* Desire, as the great enemy and detachment as the spirit in which it may be overcome. But the Buddha makes more of *Ahiṁsā,* and allows no animal sacrifices; and he lays great emphasis on Compassion, *Karuṇā,* and on Love, *Mettā.*

The vital teaching of the Upaniṣads, the oneness of all life, is accepted by the Buddha. The universalism of ethics is common to both. In both we find at every stage the process of a transference of interest from the gods to Self. With the Upaniṣads, Buddha also stressed the appreciation of manhood. He emphasized that man has to depend upon himself. More than once the Buddha said that the path of salvation begins with purity and ends in love; his commandment was: "Be pure; love the universe: do disinterested good." So he also taught those three old[3] words: Action, Purity, and Love. That Absolute Reality is incomprehensible by the intellect is admitted by both. The descriptions of the Absolute as neither void nor not-void nor both nor neither remind us of many passages in the Upaniṣads. The Buddha also shared the belief in the law of Karma, in reincarnation, and in the possibility of attaining *Nirvāṇa.*

The Buddha's attitude to the Upaniṣadic *Ātman* is a matter of great

[3] Śrī-Kṛṣṇa preached these words before the Buddha. He showed in his life the perfection of Action, Light, and Love. We find all his teachings collected in the *Bhagavad-Gītā.* When Buddha was born Śrī-Kṛṣṇa's teachings of Action Without Desire, Light, and Love had been neglected and forgotten. Perhaps the Buddha may have never come across his teachings; but what he taught was exactly that which was taught by Kṛṣṇa two thousand years before him.

controversy. So we may note some of the opinions expressed by great historians and eminent philosophers. It is generally believed that the Buddha denied the existence of the soul. This has been questioned by some who doubt whether this metaphysical aspect and the emphasis laid on it was the Buddha's or was a later interpolation and development. Some opine that there was mention of the Non-soul (*Anatta*) theory, in germ, in the Upaniṣads themselves. The dialogue between Arthabhaga and Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* is said to prove this. In the *Kaṭhopaniṣad* it is said that, when a man is dead, different people think differently about the spirit that inspired him, some saying that it still lives, others saying that it has ceased to exist; this has been compared to the later *Anatta-vāda* of the Buddhists. On the other hand, great Buddhist historians like Professor Rhys Davids argue that in using the same term, *Ātman* or *Atta,* the Buddhist and the Brahmins are talking of different things. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan observes, "... Buddha is silent about the *Ātman* enunciated in the Upaniṣads. He neither affirms nor denies its existence ... ."[4] It is said that ancient Buddhist thinkers noticed this apparently uncertain attitude of the Buddha towards the question of the Self. On the whole the best conclusion appears to be that the Buddha was silent on the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *Ātman.* The idea that he denied the existence of Self appears to be a clear case of interpolation in later times.

It may be justly said that the Buddha recognized the great thought of the Upaniṣadic seers and that he was at one with them to a great extent. Most of his teaching was common property before his time, but he transmuted common ideas and gave them a currency and significance which they did not possess before. So by his teaching Buddha helped to democratize[5] the philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which was till then confined to a select few. This perhaps is the unique contribution of Gautama Buddha to Indian culture. This process demanded that metaphysical inquiries which were not urgently relevant to the spiritual needs of the masses of men should be set aside. It was the Buddha's mission to accept the idealism of the Upaniṣads at its best, and make it available for the daily needs of mankind.

So, in his teaching, metaphysical aspects were relegated to a subordinate position. His attitude to *Ātman* and God was one of indifference and he passed them by. Beyond doubt it is a fact that in early Buddhism the old spirit is maintained, purified, ennobled, and stressed, though not the old forms. As I. B. Horner observes, looked at historically, early Buddhism "arose as the supplement, the complement and the development of the Upaniṣadic standpoint." Sometimes agreeing, sometimes adopting a

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[4] *Indian Philosophy* (Ch. VII), I. 387 [5] HOLMES : *The Creed of Buddha*

neutral attitude, sometimes developing some phases, and still at times co-ordinating the dynamic, progressive, noble, and in a sense aggressive, thought of the Upaniṣads, the Buddha by his untiring efforts enlightened a society in which the true significance of Hindu culture and philosophy had been lost in the blind performance of the rituals and sacrifices; enlivened the Hindu mind, which had been overtaken by a spirit of orthodoxy; and reformed a social structure which had been weakened by passivity, superstition, ignorance, rigidity, and other infirmities.

If so, what was the distinctive discovery that the Buddha made under the Bodhi Tree? Taking his famous sermon in the Deer Park as our guide, we may regard one point of Buddha's teaching as fundamental, viz., that just as there are ills (*heya*) and their causes (*heya-hetu*), so also is there a definite cure for them (*hana*), and a definite path leading to it (*hanopaya*). These four great truths, viz., *Dukkha, Samudaya, Nirodha, Mārga,* are the original contributions of the Buddha to world thought. From his spiritual experiences, he became convinced of these great truths and felt that for release from the ills of the world, the realization of these *Ārya Satyas* is essential. He was a practical teacher. He preached what he practised. His was a magnetic personality. His friendliness, to all who came to him in sincere search, was genuine and unreserved. A man of unfailing patience, gentleness, and sympathy, he was able to reach the common man. The inspiring person of the Buddha — this is the original thing in Buddhism.

Before we conclude, let us note the message of the Buddha for the common man. He preached the gospel of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path to the distracted world. Without troubling himself with the subtleties of metaphysics, he preached the ethical way. He laid his finger on the heart's desire for the true, the good, and the beautiful. He stressed the principles of conduct. His emphasis was on inward change of heart and on a system of self-culture. Man has to become human. He fulfilled his own ideal of "Benevolence to all, attachment to none." He taught men how to exercise their will, how to control themselves, to better themselves, and realize in themselves the highest potentialities that are open to men, and not to waste time in futile metaphysical speculations.

In the teaching of Gautama Buddha, we find a harmonious blending of *Karma-yoga* and *Jñāna-yoga* in their comprehensive meaning. What he left out was *Bhakti-yoga*, which was added by his disciples later. This made Buddhism resemble Hinduism and eventually led to its appearance as a distinct religion from India, but not till it had left a profound beneficent impress on Hinduism.

M. S. R. ANJANEYULU

PAUL HOSSFELD

Knowledge and Practical Philosophy

[We are glad to publish this article with its sincere feeling and gleams of authentic insight. Dr. Paul Hossfeld has collaborated since 1958 in the work on a critical edition of Albertus Magnus at the Albertus Magnus Institute, Bonn. Since 1964, he has also been a contributor to the journal *Philosophia Naturalis*.—ED.]

HE who devotes himself to the study of philosophy at German universities will certainly acquire sound theoretical knowledge. If he is an independent thinker, he will soon make his mark in theoretical philosophy. One thing, however, he is quite certain neither to acquire nor to get his eyes and soul opened to at our universities, viz., *practical* philosophy.

Not a few people have turned their backs on philosophy disappointed, because they had hoped for bread and got — so they say — a stone. There had been a lot of bread for the intellect — up to the sublime systems of existentialism. Experience, however, got but stone (which, by the way, is the hereditary disease of all German education). The characteristic sign of this disproportion is the fact that the representatives of "genuine" philosophy usually deal with practical philosophy in a condescending way, if they do not even pass it over in silence, or refer to it as devotional literature.

But am I perhaps mistaken in expecting universities and other cultural institutions to teach anything else but that kind of philosophy which made some people refrain from this branch of knowledge? I shall try to give an answer to this question in what follows.

Let me first try to describe some aspects of practical philosophy. To become a "practical philosopher," it is not necessary to write (or to have written) a book. But contemplation is a *conditio sine qua non.* It is not so much logical argumentation that counts in this respect as intuitive insight. Thus aphorisms are much more in keeping with practical philosophy than elaborate systems of ideas. An aphorism shows, by its very pithy and isolated form, how a truth was found by the author and accompanied him for some part of his life, and that not only intellectually. To exaggerate a little, one could say that the practical philosopher *lives* aphoristically. This does not exclude the possibility that some thoughts may often reappear in his life. But then they are *felt* afresh and not just *thought of* or considered in the memory. To acquire practical philosophy, one had better rely upon remembrance instead of memory. Practical philosophy, one could say, is neither a matter of weighty books and extensive archives nor of an accurate memory. It is on the contrary some-

thing that is preserved by man's inner self, thus forming this same inner self. It comes into action and effect at occasions offered by personal conversation and contact. Thus the opinion of a practical philosopher that every single man is unique (and that not only as far as his social status is concerned) is not mere theory or lip-service, but the result of his attitude towards everybody, be he a beggar or an industrial magnate, an uneducated man or a scholar, an unskilled worker or an expert. There are, indeed, but few people who actually live according to this attitude, and do not just talk about it in an edifying way. One basic requirement for this attitude is magnanimity, which is derived from experience and good-hearted-ness, to which thorough studies may add a great deal. Consequently, practical philosophy must be lacking in a family, factory, bureau, or books, if one tries to work off one's anger, disappointment, or bad moods. It is lacking where avarice or selfishness are to be found. But one is near it, wherever the hearty atmosphere of kindness predominates. The question is: do we find this quality at our universities?

These few lines may do to show that to write on philosophy as an academic subject and to write on philosophy as practical philosophy are very different things. And, again, it is two different things to practise and to discuss practical philosophy. That these lines, too, suffer from this difference is all too deeply felt by the author.

The academic bustle at our universities is certainly not conducive to the growth of practical philosophy. The routine, which must (necessarily!) develop at our universities, makes it more difficult to achieve practical philosophy. If, as philosophers like Bertrand Russell hold, the essence of thinking is to invent, connect, and separate signs, then our academic institutions are classical examples of thinking; the more they are rationalized, the more this kind of intellectual business is found. This way of thinking has little in common with the experiences of a practical philosopher. The very creative acts of a scholar, though, are certainly never to he replaced by card-index boxes, filing cards, or computers. But that truth which can be sought for and found systematically, that atmosphere which is promoted in the scholar by the continuous use of such means of rationalization, will hardly let arise the attitude of a wise man.

The lack of practical philosophy at our universities, which is shown above all by the rivalry of many professors, is conspicuous — more so than the same lack among teachers of high and elementary schools, since professors frequently pose as *the* authority, and since popular instinct implicity seems to back this pretension, according to the formula: where there is knowledge, there must be wisdom; where there is wisdom, there must be practical philosophy. But the profession of a scholar requires in

the first place an acute intellect, good memory, and the search (if not mania) for knowledge. This is even proved by those professors whom one should expect to be practical philosophers by profession, viz., those of philosophy and theology. True, practical philosophy is accepted into the bargain; but a young scholar and all the more so an ordinary professor must *know* something, be able to raise and answer problems, and to augment knowledge rather than wisdom.

He who strives for practical philosophy will try to establish a congruity between his life and his theories. He will select those truths which are most important for his life. From the point of view of comprehensive studies he will remain an amateur, if not (for the expert in a specialized branch of learning) a dabbler even. It is comprehensive and profound theory that counts for the scholar. According to his principles a history of refuse-disposal should be on the same level as a history of our world. Such a concentration on the intellect or on achievements of objectivation, which are connected with factual, not personal, matters, leaves but little room for the outline of "great" truths, which influence not only the life of the individual but also that of the community. The abyss between profound theoretical knowledge on the one hand and the inadequacy of the attitude towards practical philosophy on the other is even more visible if a scholar has not inherited certain resources of truth. Many a totalitarian system revealed this abyss in a most disgraceful way. How often does it happen that a scholar reasons about questions of world-outlook like a top-form boy! And very seldom is the expert on a world-outlook a practical philosopher himself.

Would the practical philosopher ever write a systematic book on practical philosophy, as is usual (and necessary!) in academic studies? I do not think so. If he writes at all, he will probably prefer to take down aphoristically what he has found out to be an important, and perhaps recurrent, truth for him, which is to influence his life profoundly. It is small wonder that he repeats himself in taking down these "great" truths. He has to practise them again and again, and he is perpetually challenged by them. Anything the practical philosopher takes down will spring from practical experience. Practical experience, however, will never fit into any philosophical system. Perhaps one may say that the practical philosopher is led by experience of everyday life to certain tendencies, which take shape one after another. Such tendencies, if taken down, can only claim to be suggestive, never binding, for other people. Science and systematic philosophy, however, must by their very nature always be regarded as generally accepted.

Thus it is completely consistent that academic philosophy likes to

avoid, or even despise, practical philosophy. Practical philosophy cannot always be grasped or circumscribed abstractly; and, what is more, its very essence often seems to be so close a unity of subject and object that it is difficult to analyse it and to crystallize from it generally accepted truths. The question is whether this is possible, or even necessary. If it is not, the professor of philosophy can only give suggestions in practical philosophy, and such a task he will usually regard as too inadequate for his position. He normally wants to *prove* the matters of his faculty. His kind of study can be organized, can be divided into certain faculties at our universities, and carried out by team-work in special institutes. It is supported by some industry or the State, for — at least indirectly — academic research implies material advantage and an increase of power. The progress of knowledge is reflected in books and magazines, which are often supported by public authorities.

Practical philosophy, however, is not organized. At best it is, as I have said before, an extra, but not a basic, requirement for an academic post. Practical philosophy may be found in a conversation which comes about by chance. Maybe this talk is followed by a series of conversations, which reveal practical philosophy. Practical philosophy flowers not in team-work, but in friendship and in conversation, which lead to and presuppose at the same time an atmosphere of mutual confidence. Practical philosophy does not pay, and, if it did, would lose its very essence. It is an advantage that practical philosophy neither pays nor yields a title, a medal, a chair, or a diploma. A simplified comparison between academic studies and practical philosophy might read as follows: the former require stillness and team-work, the latter requires solitude and conversation.

It is not an uncommon experience of practical philosophy that somebody feels profoundly happy because he has waited for truth at a lonely place on the beach or in the wood and has found out that there is actually something like truth. Though he does not have any concrete result, he is deeply satisfied. From the point of view of science such an attitude is an annoyance, nonsense, or a psychiatric problem. Scientists have had the experience, though, that they often have to wait patiently until they arrive at a conclusion or find out something new. But they would never think themselves happy just because they know that there must be some great truth somewhere, without, however, achieving any result. The practical philosopher, too, is only on the way towards such an attitude — to maintain that he had already achieved this attitude fully would be to build up an extreme. The scientists must take time by the forelock, in order to be up to date. The practical philosopher should be able sometimes to dream away his time "uselessly." The best advice one can give

to a scientist is to set up a card-index of quotations, biographical data, test results, etc., in order to use them later for his scientific studies. The same is true for the philosopher, in so far as he is in search of knowledge. He who wants to find, and live according to, practical philosophy had better take down the truths he finds in a notebook. On occasion he may get some hints for his everyday life by reading and rereading these notes.

But all these differences granted, it would be wrong to set up a radical contrast between scholastic studies and practical philosophy. Such a separation would imply that a man of nature would be nearer to wisdom than a learned man. Such can only be the opinion of a person who idealizes the natural state of man in a romantic way; notwithstanding the fact that every "man of nature" is in some way or other a "man of culture," even if culture means no more than the use of fire and mallets. Considering the state of cultural achievements, practical philosophy cannot exist without a certain amount of knowledge, which has been acquired either directly at the universities or indirectly, viz., by means of literature, newspapers, speeches, or conversation. The widened horizon of knowledge may lead to an intensification of practical philosophy, though this is not necessarily the case, as the example of many scientists and professors of philosophy shows, who are experts in their branches of learning, but almost appallingly narrow-minded as far as practical philosophy is concerned. One might ask whether there is some promise of practical philosophy in academic studies as such, above all in psychology, sociology, and history; less so or not at all in the sciences, which deal with figures and geometric constructions, like mathematics, or which can be "mathematicized," like physics, chemistry, sociometry, psychometry, etc.

There is, then, no radical contrast between knowledge and practical philosophy, but the practical philosopher takes scientific and philosophic knowledge only as a means to an end and does not consider it as an end in itself, as not a few scientists and philosophical professors do.

Practical philosophy is closely linked to nature. One's own significance and the pseudo-important sorrows of everyday life are thrown into the shade by it. The narrow horizon of egotism, will for power and thirst for pleasure is overcome. Thus nature enables man to bear the loneliness which he may have imposed upon himself on purpose, viz., in order to refrain from following his instincts and to learn how to make other people happy, instead of expecting anything from them.

The practical philosopher may find deep satisfaction in listening to nature, even in the dead of night. This has nothing to do with poetic imagination or daydreaming. He tries on the contrary to analyse what he passively experiences. A scientist would never listen, but the practical

philosopher considers it as one of his main tasks to listen — to listen without inner effusiveness.

Practical philosophy and solitude have much in common. The wise man is attracted by solitary places. He likes to be alone — not deserted — inwardly. Thus he would like to *experience* (not to *study*!) because it is beautiful in a way and valuable.

The practical philosopher never tires in his love for a certain person; he accompanies him or her; he becomes mature by these endeavours, without having consciously striven for this maturity. The beloved person, too, becomes mature by these endeavours, and this interplay is very important for the practical philosopher. For him this is a social way of realizing practical philosophy.

He who is really fascinated by the idea of practical philosophy tries to support the partner of his conversation, even his adversary, instead of showing him directly or indirectly that he is inferior.

The practical philosopher does not want to reform society. At least he does not propagate the idea that everywhere everything has to become different, nor does he maintain that all people should become practical philosophers like himself. But his disposition enables him to emanate practical philosophy in the world around him. One or another of his relatives or acquaintances may thus be induced to seek — and perhaps to find — a practical philosophy of his own individual shade.

PAUL HOSSFELD

Longing for Nirvana

For misty farness of Nirvana
I changed my longing and belief
I will not sing to earth Hosanna
And fall from life as autumn leaf

My body will there die for ever,
My life appearing as a dream,
My Self as if existing never
In formless It of cosmic stream.

ANATOLE VON SPAKOVSKY

JOSEPH M. GALLANAR

Louis Claude de Saint-Martin: Man in Time

[We publish below the second and concluding part of Dr. Gallanar's well-documented and lucid article on the thought of the great eighteenth-century mystic, Louis Claude de Saint-Martin. The first part appeared in our May 1967 issue.—ED.]

II

ACKNOWLEDGING his indebtedness to Jacob Boehme and his own earlier discussion in *L'Esprit des Choses* (1801), Saint-Martin described Universal Being as resting on two fundamental bases, i.e., force and resistance. This "double desire" (using Boehme's symbolism) remains at its centre and yet develops its splendour. While its generative powers are diverse they act as one and maintain a unity with the Eternal Spirit (Boehme's Soul of the World) which they engender without end. Knowledge of the Universal Being cannot be had through unaided human observation or human reason. Instead of attempting to scrutinize the nature of the Universal Being through the mind or the heart man ought to redirect his attention to its action — for its action is its entire Nature.[23] The "offspring" of the universal unity is an engenderment in the present time and an actual and complete expression of the union of the two powers. But it is also a progressive union with all the possible productions which may be visible to man. Thus, the cosmos has a life and soul of its own.[24]

Man experiences this "action" through an inner experience rather than by means of observations. Within his inner nature man feels the Divine Sources with their universal spirit "abounding and flowing together" in him; he feels that he is a constant and perpetual result of the engenderment of his generative principle and he recognizes himself as a being "... *qui est susceptible de sentir bouillonner sans cesse en lui la source divine* ... ."[25] Through thought man reascends to the origin of his being, i.e., to his genesis. He has a fixed idea of his origin. He is born and born for ever in the eternal source. But man is also born in the source of desire for God as an eternal desire and an eternal will.

But to become divine is to share in divine purpose. It is to continue God where God is no longer known by himself. Rather than continuing him in the divine order where God never ceases from being known, man's duty is to continue him in that visible realm in which he can be known only through manifestations and images. In performing this task man

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[23] *Le Ministère de l'Homme-Esprit*, 146–7

[24] *Ibid.*, 150

[25] *Ibid.*, 153

serves as a worker of God; he is strengthened by a force from the divine source; it retraces within him divine generation.[26]

God's existence is farther from man than his action; it is his action which serves as an intermediary and it is his action which preserves man from destruction. If it were not for divine action, man would be totally destroyed. In man's spiritual region an active and vivifying medium destroys false substances; it is through this medium that the divine contract between God and man is renewed. Thus, man's juncture with this action is a necessity of his being. Through the presence of this divine and living action man can carry this divine contract to all men past, present, and future. Man is rendered the "action of things" and through the eruption of the spirit within himself he becomes the "action of things." As man's spirit approaches the universal centre, man is ravished with a multitude of gifts and talents which aid him and lead him to his final end of eternal life and enlightenment. Thus to come into one with God's purpose results in man's becoming the action of things.[27]

Man is plunged into the midst of disorders and anguish, evil and suffering. Man must recognize and grasp that there is a harmonizing power which continually engenders itself and balances disorder, anguish, and infection which surrounds man. This is the Word which is the depository of eternal standards, eternal light, and eternal life. Furthermore, man must recognize that if it were not for the Word the universe would not be sustained. This is a positive and physical fact. Thus, God sustains all by the power of his Word.[28] Without it, animals and plants would return to their source; the phenomena of the universe would no longer be observable to man; man's thought would return into darkness; his soul would return to the abyss.[29]

Man's belief in God ought to be recognized as an extreme need of man rather than that which ought to be the subject of philosophical discourse. Positive proof of this need exists within man himself. Aware of his destitute state he cannot but feel the need for a preserving force. To ignore this need is to fall back into the abyss. Thus, man must support himself on the Word.[30]

Man can only recover the Word through suffering. The Word is universally in a state of suffering and anguish. That which visibly exists is a physical representation of the Word in anguish. The anguish and suffering experienced by man must not be avoided; for this experience is profitable and germinal for him. For only through this feeling of anguish can the Word be reborn.[31]

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[26] *Ibid.*, 166
[27] *Ibid.*, 179–82
[28] *Ibid.*, 320
[29] *Ibid.*, 319, 320–2
[30] *Ibid.*, 322
[31] *Ibid.*, 329, 330

The Divine Word can open continually within man the way to divinity, light, and truth. The Word is divine desire which is personified in a human manner and in constant action. Man, rather than seeking God through the weakened expressions of his faith, is sought by God through the continuity of an inexhaustible action. Desire is felt within man; it animates him and creates him eternally. The Divine Word must penetrate into man's inner self, fructify itself within him, and bring to him the growth of his generative principle. Man's soul becomes a continual expression of God's desire, which will be known to man since he will manifest that desire and in so doing form a perfect union between himself and God.[32]

The Word without ceasing passes continually from death to life and is as a prodigy continually reborn. Man, in so far as he has recourse to this guide and by union with it, will be reborn from death to life. He will share in its property of being a prodigy continually reborn. The divine operates in man and the universe through a continual sacrifice of the Word as it continually substitutes itself for the obstructing substance. The actions of God and the actions of man are related to one another in that they become perpetually simultaneous. Man is spirit. God is spirit. Man is able to assist God in balancing the divine movements in his particular region. Man establishes in his individual being the harmony which God engenders and maintains universally. Man is able to render the Word as law within his sphere in the same manner as God has done universally.[33]

Man is destined to be the active Word in his "realm" and he must develop his forces towards this end. Saint-Martin views the problem in terms of time and eternity. Time, which appears so short to man, is in actuality an immense extension. There is not one point of time in which eternity in its entirety cannot be confined; therefore, an instant is sufficient to embrace eternity. But man does not know how to determine the present. Hoping to find in the present that which is lacking man fixes his attention on that which is changing, i.e., the terrestrial, scientific, political order which surrounds him. And instead of fixing the present he is only returned to that which is past. For man to fix his attention on the time present or that which is not in time he must look to the future. Instead of becoming narrator of what has happened, man becomes a prophet.[34]

Since the man of God instructs those similar to himself his words are a living confirmation of his election and of the living presence of the spirit within him. Man is therefore a perpetual and inexhaustible medium

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[32] *Ibid.*, 334, 337, 342, 414 [33] *Ibid.*, 419, 451, 454 [34] *Ibid.*, 456–8

for prodigies because the divine life lives in him and perpetually enters him in order to bring about the works which it has confided to him.[35]

What has been identified as a theme in the thought of Louis Claude de Saint-Martin was observed through selected writings only from the earlier and later parts of his life. In summarizing, this theme may be described as follows. Saint-Martin seeks for the way whereby man can escape the destructiveness of time and return to that which is permanent and eternal. Man, an active and creative being, the visible expression of divinity itself, has fallen from a state of primordial unity through the corruption of his will, the attachment of himself to the principles governing the sensible universe, and the bringing about of the falling of all beings in the universe. While subjected, therefore, to the corroding effects of time, man experiences boredom, which comes from his own foreignness in the temporal. While his nature is indestructible even in the fall and divine or occult forces are present to aid him, he cannot return to this state of primordial unity solely through their aid because of the depravity and corruption of his will.

Only in his later writings does he resolve this problem. Reframing many of his ideas in the symbolic language of Jacob Boehme and accepting the notion that man can reascend to his source through his thought becauuse man by his nature is "*pensée de Dieu,*" he develops these points into his arguments. Only after man has reascended by means of his thought to his source can he again grasp the Divine Word (the generative principle) and render the Word law in his own realm as God has done in His. In so doing he restores the universe to its proper unity. Man is able to share in eternal life.

JOSEPH M. GALLANAR

Past and future veil God from our sight;
Burn up both of them with fire. How long
Wilt thou be partitioned by these segments, like a reed?
So long as a reed is partitioned, it is not privy to secrets,
Nor is it vocal in response to lip and breathing.

JALAL-UD-DIN RUMI

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[35] *Ibid.*, 459

G. NAGESWARA RAO

T. S. Eliot's Use of the Upanishad

[We are glad to welcome to our pages Shri G. Nageswara Rao, M.A., Lecturer in English at Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati. He has done research under a University Grants Commission Fellowship on "The Influence of Indian Scriptures on T. S. Eliot" for a Post-Doctoral degree. He is also the Literature Secretary and the Editor of the *Bulletin* of Arts and Crafts Association, Tirupati. In this article he makes very illuminating use of the Upaniṣadic context of the passage used by T. S. Eliot in *The Waste Land*.—ED.]

IN SPITE OF the welter of books dealing with the many-sided achievement of T. S. Eliot, his use of the message of the thunder from the *Bṛhadāraṇyka-Upaniṣad* in his *The Waste Land* is not adequately explained. That the Upaniṣadic message forms the crux of his poem is unquestionable. The unsympathetic critics of the twenties and thirties considered Eliot's use of the Hindu scripture as an aspect of his "pretentious bungling." Some critics attributed the obscurity of the poem to the four Sanskrit words: *datta, dayadhvam, dāmyata* and *śāntiḥ*. Even Eliot's champions like Ezra Pound referred to his use of the Sanskrit scripture with a casualness that betrays an inadequate critical attention to it. Rebutting a reviewer's acrimony, Pound said the obscurity of the poem is due to the Sanskrit words, that "one can pass them by ... without losing the general tone of the poem" and that "they are so obviously the words of some ritual or other."[1] The most deceptive of all reasons which account for the insufficient critical thought bestowed on these vital words could be Eliot's own notes on them. They give the necessary translation, enough for any one to proceed with the poem with an illusion of understanding.

A close study of the original context in which the message is delivered in the Upaniṣad and its function there, and then an examination of Eliot's deft adaptation of it in his poem in a new context for a totally different purpose, is amply rewarding. For, besides promoting a deeper understanding and hence a fuller response to the poem, the study reveals a new facet in the range of the poet's sensibility and a new aspect of the triumph of his technique and craftsmanship.

In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*,[2] the threefold message is symbolic both in its conception and execution. The triple offspring of Prajāpati,

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[1] See HUGH KENNER: *The Invisible Poet: T. S. Eliot* (W. H. Allen, London, 1960), p. 130

[2] For all references to the Upaniṣad, see S. RADHAKRISHNAN'S (ed.) *The Principal Upaniṣads* (Muirhead Library of Philosophy), pp. 289–91.

gods, men and demons (*deva, manushya* and *asura*), after the completion of their education under their father, ask him what virtues they have to cultivate to lead a meaningful life. Then Prajāpati utters to each of them in turn the syllable *da* and asks them what they have understood from it. The gods say that for them it means *dāmyata,* "control yourself"; the men that it means *datta,* "give"; and to the demons it conveys *dayadhvam,* "be compassionate." What is significant here is that the same syllable *da* conveys different meanings to different beings or different beings derive different meanings from it: and that the message that each group derives is born out of an instinctive consciousness on its own part of its own main lack. To the gods it says "control yourself," because, endowed as they are with great powers, what they need to acquire is self-control. As men are by nature selfish and greedy it exhorts them to give. To the demons who are strong and cruel by nature it says "be compassionate." Symbolically, it is obvious that to live a peaceful and meaningful life leading to salvation, the gods have to cultivate self-control and overcome their inherent weakness; men have to conquer their selfishness; and the demons must rid themselves of their inherent cruelty.

The cryptic mode of Prajāpati's utterance opened new avenues of artistic possibilities for Eliot. It offered him a new poetic technique to deliver a message of redemption to the inhabitants of the waste land without risking the usual pitfalls of explicit didacticism. The implicit notion which he wanted to convey in his poem is the need for a full consciousness of one's shortcomings. Only this kind of self-realization, proceeding from a full awareness of inherent drawbacks, can liberate the inhabitants of the waste land from their living death and spiritual miasma. From the beginning of the poem through image, metaphor, symbol and myth, Eliot drives home the necessity of recognizing the higher reality beyond our diurnal routine. The protagonist invites us to see the naked reality which is entirely different from what we think we have experienced and what we hope to find in the future.

> ... I will show you something different from either
> Your shadow at morning striding behind you
> Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;
> I will show you fear in a handful of dust.[3]

In the section symbolically named *A Game of Chess*, he depicts the deplorable predicament of humanity devoid of this basic realization. What religion was at one time, sex (particularly sex without children)

[3] *The Waste Land*, ll. 27–30.

is to the modern world. When the vital principle of life is reduced to the level of drug addiction, and marriage, the holiest of human institutions, to a kind of licence for this addiction, life on earth is nothing more than a game of chess.

For the rich and poor alike, life has lost its value. The life of the rich has become a mechanical routine, a continuous war of nerves with the encircling ennui.

> 'What shall we ever do?'
> The hot water at ten.
> And if it rains, a closed car at four.
> And we shall play a game of chess,
> Pressing lidless eyes and waiting for a
> knock upon the door.[4]

To what depths of degradation the domestic life of the poorer classes has fallen is vividly conveyed through the conversation of the cockney women in the pub. The section closes with a challenging question:

> "What you get married for if you don't want children?"[5]

The Fire Sermon, a phrase borrowed from the Buddha, symbolically depicts the actual state of the vast panorama of futility and anarchy that is modern life. In his fire sermon the Buddha described all things as burning in the fire of desire. His phrase served Eliot admirably to depict the inhabitants of the waste land as burning in the fire of sterile lust. The root cause of this burning of life in the fire of lust is desire. To be free from the wheel of suffering, according to the Buddha, one must follow the path of asceticism leading to *nirvāṇa,* the "blowing out" of the fire of desire (this is the root meaning of the word). St. Augustine too saw humanity as burning in the unholy fire of lust and he too suggested asceticism as the cure. As Eliot points out,[6] the collocation of these two representatives of eastern and western asceticism is not an accident. For, both have arrived at the same truth independently; and, where truth is concerned, biography and geography do not count.

The death by water in the next section is a metaphorical death into a new life: a baptismal death. It is the quenching of the fire of desire by the waters of knowledge. Symbolically, it is the emergence of a totally new person through the extinction of the previous gross person. Only by such a thorough transformation can man render himself capable of realizing the true ideal of life, and live by it. This transformation requires an

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[4] *Ibid.,* ll. 134–38.
[5] *The Waste Land,* ll. 164.
[6] *Ibid.* See Eliot's note line 309.

unsparing and disinterested self-scrutiny.

Eliot presents this type of self-exploration in the section, *What the Thunder Said*. The "decay of Europe" and the fall of towers and cities represent the crumbling of false civilization and false ideals, the fall essential for a new building. The two journeys, the journey to Emmaus and the journey to the Chapel Perilous, stand for a spiritual quest. The pain and horror of the quest is wonderfully conveyed in terms of a journey through a dry rocky desert with a landscape of drought:

> Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think
> Sweat is dry and feet are in the sand
> If there were only water amongst the rock
> Dead mountain mouth of carious teeth that cannot spit
> Here one can neither stand nor lie nor sit
> There is not even silence in the mountains[7]

At the close of this phantasmagoria of horror and delirium comes the heart-easing "Co co rico co co rico," the call of the bird of dawn, with its spiritual association of nativity, powers to chase away all evil and darkness, heralding new light.

Then, in a short movement of evocative poetry, Eliot creates the appropriate background for the introduction of the Upaniṣadic message. He takes us back to the source of the Ganga and the forests of the Himalayas, the home of all vegetation myths and fertility cults according to Miss Weston.

> Ganga was sunken, and the limp leaves
> Waited for rain, while the black clouds
> Gathered far distant, over Himavant.
> The jungle crouched, humped in silence.[8]

Ganga, the symbol of continuous life on earth, is sunken. Starved creation is waiting for rain. The clouds bearing life-giving waters have gathered over Himavant, the source of the Ganga and the home of all spiritual wisdom from time immemorial, the peak symbolizing spiritual aspiration. The world is yearning for the message. Then speaks the thunder, not Prajāpati. Evidently, Eliot is adapting the idea expressed in the Upaniṣad itself. After the message of Prajāpati, the reader's attention is directed to the divine voice of thunder: "The very thing the heavenly voice thunder repeats *da, da, da*, that is control yourself, give, be compassionate."[9]

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[7] *The Waste Land*, ll. 336–41.

[8] *Ibid.*, ll. 396–400.

[9] S. RADHAKRISHNAN: *The Principal Upaniṣads*, p. 290.

Eliot rearranged the triad *datta, dayadhvam, damyata* in a new order of natural sequence. The commands are delivered separately and the original cryptic mode of delivery is retained. The different aspects of the message reveal different meanings to different types of people in the waste land, enabling each type to realize its own major drawback. At the same time, taken together, it serves as a general message to humanity as a whole. The message is announced very aptly by the heavenly voice of thunder. Apart from the Upaniṣadic authenticity, it is quite in harmony with the setting: the cock crowing, a flash of lightning, a damp gust bringing rain, the sunken Ganga, the limp leaves waiting for rain, the black clouds gathered far distant over Himavant and the jungle crouched and humped in silence. Now it is more appropriate that the cosmic voice of thunder should announce the message rather than Prajāpati. An introduction of Prajāpati into this picture would be out of place; it would look like an external intervention by a God in the machine, not a natural revelation.

Obviously, Eliot exploited the rich poetic possibilities and the symbolic connotations of the Upaniṣadic setting and mode of utterance. We must notice that he did not merely repeat it. Such of the connotations as are of value and relevance are fully suggested, so that the reader might not miss the richness and many-sided impact of the message. All the three different responses to the same syllable *da,* as in the Upaniṣad, show that the particular section of people have grasped the highest ideal expressed in each of the three commands. Eliot combined all the three commands into a single message; dropping the details of *deva, asura* and *manushya,* he gave it a fully human significance. The changes he made have a high philosophical basis advocated by Sankara. Sankara comments on the Upaniṣadic message:

> Other than men, there are neither gods nor demons ... . Those who are predominantly selfish are men. In the same way, men who are inclined to cruelty and to inflict pain are demons. The same men, if they acquire self-control and overcome the other two defects, are eligible to be styled as gods ... .[10]

Therefore when Eliot telescoped the triad into a single message retaining its triple significance and made it thoroughly human, dropping the detail of *deva, manushya, asura,* he was following a great tradition besides exercising his individual talent.

From what the thunder has said, the protagonist realizes the true ideal of life and sets about putting his lands in order. Each ideal sets

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[10] S. RADHAKRISHNAN'S (ed.): *The Principal Upaniṣads,* p. 290 ff.

him to an unsparing introspective self-analysis. After *datta* he questions himself about what he has given. He realizes that he has not given himself up to any high ideal. He has yielded only to sterile lust, not to the demands of love, essential for the preservation of life and race. This is a guilt that cannot be washed away by ordinary penance:

> The awful daring of a moment's surrender
> Which an age of prudence can never retract[11]

The command *dayadhvam* opens his eyes to the fact that he has never sympathized with anything outside himself. He has locked himself up in the prison of his own self. Hearing the third command *dāmyata,* he becomes aware of the need for self-control, for submitting himself to the universal law, that is the need to control individual impulses, to steer the boat of life in accordance with the eternal laws, the tide, current and winds of the sea. In short, to lead a meaningful life, one has to cultivate self-control and live in harmony with the eternal law, "beating obedient to controlling hands," to reach shore safely. This full realization leads to "a peace which passeth understanding." So the poem *The Waste Land* fittingly ends with:

> Datta. Dayadhvam. Damyata.
> Shantih shantih shantih

What I want to point out is not that Eliot was a Hindu at heart, but that he had a full grasp of the Upaniṣadic setting, its message and its spirit. He conveyed the need of the message with poetic compulsion and urgency. His aim was not to advocate the need of a particular faith, but to take us to those deeper unnamed feelings and experiences which form the substratum of all faiths. To drive home the necessity of a full awareness of this undefinable ideal through a process of poetic communication, he found the Upaniṣadic message indispensable. Evidently, he wanted us to understand the four words *datta, dayadhvam, dāmyata* and *śāntiḥ,* not merely to mean give, sympathize, control and peace, as is commonly done but by recreating the original context and repeating the actual words, he wanted us to feel them in a particular way, the Upaniṣadic way.

GUTTIKONDA NAGESWARA RAO

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[11] *The Waste Land,* II. 404–5

New Books and Old

Great Thinkers on Education*

THIS BOOK is an anthology of the writings of the world's great thinkers on education from antiquity to modern times. The volume is a veritable encyclopaedia of the educational philosophies of more than a fifty of the world's celebrated thinkers, ranging from such sages of antiquity as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, St. Augustine, and Quintilian to such modern thinkers of note as Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Immanuel Kant, John Dewey, W. H. Kilpatrick, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, Bertrand Russell, Einstein, and A. N. Whitehead — to mention only some of them.

A review of a volume containing so large a number of contributions from thinkers so far removed from one another in time and clime cannot possibly give even the barest summaries of the contributions collected. Not attempting, therefore, anything like a kaleidoscopic survey of the whole rich variety of thoughts presented in the book, I shall only pick and choose some points and passages here and there.

> There are two inventions of man [says Kant] which may be regarded as the most difficult of all, namely, the art of government and the art of education; and people are still divided as to their true idea (p. 328).

That divergent views regarding the purpose and method of education have been expressed from time to time by different thinkers cannot be denied, but it should not be difficult to see that a common golden thread runs through them all, viz., the consensus of opinion of all educationists of all times that the ultimate purpose of education, in its true and non-utilitarian sense, is the perfection of the human personality. The ancients always conceived this perfection in ethico-spiritual terms — righteous living and union with God — not infrequently with a pronounced other-worldly and a-social slant. The moderns accentuate rather the elements of social consciousness and the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the scientific outlook.

Let us cast a glance at the views of some noted contemporary educationists to see where educational thinking is focusing itself today. Here is John Dewey, perhaps the greatest of modern American educationists, emphasizing the social purpose of education:

> I believe, finally, that the teacher is engaged, not simply in the training of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life. I believe that every teacher should realize the dignity of his calling, that he is a social servant set apart for the maintenance of proper social order and the securing of the right social growth.
>
> I believe that the teacher always is the prophet of the true God and usherer in of the true kingdom of God. (p. 188)

As the ancients laid a central emphasis on the imparting of religious and theological knowledge in the educational process, so the moderns on the teaching of science. Herbert Spencer pin-pointed the consensus of contemporary opinion on the value of science when he said:

> What knowledge is of most worth? — the uniform reply is — Science. This is the verdict on all counts ... . Necessary and eternal are its truths, all Science concerns all mankind for all time. (p. 694)

But while the teaching of science is unquestionably desirable and good, what is of greater significance, *from the educational point of view,* is driving

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* *Classics in Education.* Edited by WADE BASKIN. (Philosophical Library, New York. 728 pp. 1966. $12.00)

home to the minds of the learners of science the processes by which science has been developed and widened. Dagobert D. Runes has well brought out this aspect of the matter:

> The important thing is to examine and comprehend the process by which science was developed and widened. The mere memorization of scientific data is of quite secondary significance; undue stress on the memorizing of parts and particles of animal and plant bodies with their ancient Latin or Greek names, will elevate no mind, but burden many. (p. 611)

The mere accumulation of scientific data, adds Runes, accomplishes nothing of significance educationally: "Nearly all of it remains shelf wisdom — and not self-improvement" (p. 612).

Not only comprehending the processes by which science is developed and widened is of significance, but also, I would add, comprehending the *limitations of scientific knowledge.*

Albert Einstein suggests orientating education to developing in young individuals

> those qualities and capabilities which are of value for the welfare of the commonwealth. But that does not mean that individuality should be destroyed and the individual become a mere tool of the community, like a bee or an ant. For a community of standardized individuals without personal originality and personal aims would be a poor community without possibilities for development. (p. 196)

Space will not permit me to do any further justice to the contents of the volume. A perusal of the book will be amply rewarding to all students and teachers of the philosophy of education. A selection of representative writings from world-wide sources on any subject whatsoever is a difficult task indeed, and our author has shown commendable judiciousness in his selection. Only one omission somewhat disquiets me. Why has nothing from the writings of Indian educationists been incorporated in the volume? I am persuaded that such leaders of thought of renascent India as Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi, Rabindranath Tagore, Sri Aurobindo, and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan have given expression to thoughts on education well worthy of universal consideration. But for this, I do consider the anthology a classic on the subject and congratulate the Editor heartily on his brilliant attempt.

S. N. L. SHRIVASTAVA

An Intelligent Person's Guide to the Religions of Mankind. By HANS-JOACHIM SCHOEPS. Translated from the German by RICHARD and CLARA WINSTON. (Victor Gollancz Ltd., London. xiii+320 pp. 1967. 25*s*.)

> The present situation [concludes Professor Schoeps] is characterized by a restive searching in all the world's religions, an attempt to translate the original message of each religion into the terms of a world transformed by technology, so that modern man will once again be able to understand the ancient tidings of salvation.

This being so, and few will deny it, how apposite that the new series of the famous Intelligent Man's Guides should contain this superb, unprejudiced, balanced survey by one of the few men living competent to do it. At only one point can we fault this volume. Having whetted the appetite of his readers, the author has provided no select bibliography for further reading.

The book opens boldly with the assertion that religions are paths to salvation, attempting to answer man's fearful questions and to liberate him from the toils that hinder communion with divinity. The implications of this are developed in fifty pages of prolegomena dealing with aspects and problems of the science of religion — definition, origins, basic ideas, modes of the god-man relation, typical personalities etc. — and concluding with an account of

the difficulty of classifying religions to justify the simple, but admittedly superficial, basis adopted in the book: the distinction between the dead and the living, and geographical spread. Something under a hundred pages are given to crisp but informative accounts of extinct religions in and out of Europe. Some may argue that the space were better given to a fuller account of religions still effective. Yet, in fact, the old religions, through their cultural remains and ideological influences, are in a sense still with us. What is gathered here is of immense interest and provides what could be available to the ordinary reader only after much research and reference.

The bulk of the book, however, is very properly devoted to, and fairly divided between, the great religions of the East: Hinduism and Buddhism in particular, and those of Tibet, China, and Japan in general; and what are rightly called the religions of Biblical revelation: Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. Inevitably the zealous of each faith will think that less than justice has been done, in extent and content, to their own. Those who take this book on its own terms will marvel at the high degree of objectivity attained. Professor Schoeps is concerned to set out the facts and not to make value judgements. By so doing, he has provided his readers not just with a convenient book of reference but with a means to understand and assess for himself what the Spirit is saying, amid the confusions and rejections of our world, to the spirit of man.

The concluding words are a quotation from Matthias Claudius: "Despise no religion, for it is of the spirit, and you do not know what may lie hidden beneath inconspicuous symbols." We cannot forbear commenting on the appropriateness not only to the author but to the publisher, the late Victor Gollancz, to whom the world owes so much, not least for giving it books of this kind at a price within the reach of so many.

MARCUS WARD

Man, the Measure of All Things. By SRI KRISHNA PREM and SRI MADHAVA ASHISH. (The Theosophical Publishing House, Madras. xi+459 pp. 1966. Rs. 10.60; cloth Rs. 12.80)

An Upaniṣad declares that in matters pertaining to the spirit, "who says it" is as important as what is said. This thought struck the reviewer as he glanced through the pages of this extremely difficult and at the same time profound book. The title at once suggests the statement of Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things," which sums up the pragmatic view of the Sophists, who opposed it to the Herclitean doctrine of flux. In that sense, nothing could be farther from the intention of this book, which is cosmocentric in its perspective and not at all anthropocentric.

The presentation is cosmogonic, and purports to be an elaborate commentary on the Stanzas of Dzyan, the text of which is drawn from the selection given in *The Secret Doctrine* by Madame Blavatsky, the great founder of the Theosophical Movement. In analysing the meaning of reality as cryptically expressed in these verses, the authors have found in them "a profundity of meaning and a universality of application beyond anything sanctified by the joint approval of orthodox religion and orthodox scholarship."

The book is the result of decades of study, the first draft having been prepared twenty-five years ago, with the help of the late Mr. Bertram Keightly, a personal disciple of Madame Blavatsky. But it has to be stressed that although Shri-Krishna-Prem's interest in Buddhism and Theosophy was the cause of his being drawn to India, neither he nor his collaborator and disciple was a member of the Theosophical Society. The aim of this book is stated to be to "help to remove even a few of those

glittering veils with which 'the face of Truth is covered over,'" adapting the words of the *Īśāvāsya Upaniṣad.*

Shri-Krishna-Prem (Ronald Henry Nixon), born in England in 1898, took his M.A. Degree at King's College, Cambridge, after service in World War I as a fighter pilot, and came to India in search of the spiritual life. He worked for some time as Professor of English at Lucknow and Banaras Universities. At the age of thirty he took *Saṅnyāsa,* and his Guru Shri-Yashoda-Mai introduced him to the orthodox Vaiṣṇava tradition. Shri-Krishna-Prem made a serious study of Sanskrit and Pali and could speak Bengali as well as Hindi fluently. He lived a deeply spiritual, devoted, and humble life at an *Āśrama* a few miles from Almora, and collected round him a band of earnest-minded disciples, Indian and foreign.

Among the latter was the co-author of this book, Shri-Madhava-Ashish, who had come from England during the Second World War as a ground engineer assigned to an airfield in Bengal. While on a holiday in the Himalayas, he heard about Shri-Krishna-Prem, walked over one day to see him, and then never left him. Shri-Krishna-Prem's two books: *The Yoga of the Bhagavad-Gita,* and *The Yoga of the Kathopanishad,* have been a source of inspiration to many seekers. Shri-Krishna-Prem passed away in November 1965. A brief memoir of him by Gertrude Emerson Sen appeared in THE ARYAN PATH for March 1966. Shri-Krishna-Prem had contributed several articles to THE ARYAN PATH in earlier years, including those which were collected later as *The Yoga of the Bhagavad-Gita.*

The range of erudition displayed in this remarkable work is as impressive as the depth of insight. The works of Plato and Plotinus; the Upaniṣads; Theosophical literature; books of Christian, Tibetan, and Zen mysticism; the writings of the Sufis; as well as the *Koran* and the *Zohar,* have all been laid under contribution. Among moderns may be mentioned Jane Harrison's studies of Greek religion, the writings of Freud and Jung, and, in particular, A. N. Whitehead and the late Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy.

Each of the seven Stanzas of Dzyan has a chapter devoted to it, the subject-matter being respectively: Being in Latency; Latent Power; The Birth of Mind; The Causal Hierarchy; The Fiery Whirlwind; Establishment; and Life. Years of intensive application would be needed to unravel the secret of the verses, provided one has the needful *Saṁskāras.* To others it will remain a sealed book. Perhaps it is just as well.

K. GURU DUTT

Perception and Our Knowledge of the External World. By DON LOCKE. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Humanities Press Inc., New York. 243 pp. 1967. 42*s.*); *Seeing, Knowing and Believing: A Study of the Language of Visual Perception.* By JONAS F. SOLTIS. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc., Reading, Massachusetts. 156 pp. 1966. 25*s.*)

These two books are largely concerned with the same subject. The author of the former, from New Zealand, is a lecturer at Newcastle University. The author of the second book is an Assistant Professor, Philosophy and Education Teachers College, Columbia University.

Gone are the days of Ward, McTaggart, Sorley. Since Moore, university philosophy has been dominated by an all-powerful convention. The philosophers study the meaning of words — although not one of them is a philologist. They live by taking in each other's washing: they make a career by dealing with each other's books metic-

ulously. They write these deliberations into books. The hungry sheep look up and are not fed.

J. F. Soltis writes — truly — of "the usual dead ends and blind alleys found in epistemology" and of "the morass of technical philosophical discussions," but, alas, he is in the grip of the sterile convention.

It is significant how both authors dilate on the dagger in *Macbeth*.

One proof that philosophers preoccupied with words ought to know about them is to be found in Mr. Don Locke's book: on p. 162 "its" is used five times for "it 's."

The reviewer may legitimately be called upon for positive criticism. Surely the truth is that all experience is mental. It is relative to the powers of the percipients. Sense organs do not perceive: it is mind that perceives; and *quidquid percipitur percipitur secundum modum percipientis* — whatever is perceived is perceived according to the capacities of the percipient. In the central clearing-station in the mind the incoming data are sorted and interpreted, partly by instinctive interpretations inherited from the ancestry. It is wrong (as Earl Russell pointed out in a broadcast in 1958) to suppose that physical things are as they are represented in the perception of them we have. The "outside" world is a construction by our minds to fit the network of actions and observations we are concerned with.

Each species of animal and bird has senses specialized by the interests of the ancestry. Bees see flowers very different from the same flowers that we see.

In so far as other beings share experiences with us, they share a universe common to them and us. Obviously, beings with different images of the universe live in what are to them different universes while at the same time living in one that is common in some respects. The universe is not experienced wholly. Of all the vast range of rays of different amplitudes, from infinitesimally small to those of miles, only a very small number are picked up by the powers of perception, including the senses, that we have developed. Although the senses are very many more than five, in an ocean of potential experiences these powers are nets, through which vast numbers of potential experiences pass unobstructed and unobserved though they include things that have effects on things that we perceive.

R. F. RATTRAY

A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. By FUNG YU-LAN. Edited by DERK BODDE. (The Free Press, New York; Collier-Macmillan Ltd., London. 368 pp. First Free Press paperback edition, 1966. 25*s*.)

"The place which philosophy has occupied in Chinese civilization has been compared to that of religion in other civilizations." With this his first sentence Professor Fung sets the tone for this remarkably cogent abridgement of his two-volume *History of Chinese Philosophy*. Dr. Bodde, who has translated the larger work, here appears as editor and adviser. There is really nothing in English to compare with this *Short History*, as it covers the whole field and not merely, e.g., the Confucian or Taoist traditions or branches like logic or ethics. Wearing his erudition with truly Chinese grace and ease, Professor Fung proceeds from the "Spirit" and the "Background" of Chinese philosophy to its position, and indeed future, in the modern world (1948). China's philosophy, we read, like her art and poetry, is suggestive and aphoristic (p. 13); Continental China naturally produced a philosophy different from that of maritime Greece (p. 25); typical of an agricultural people is the fact that, by contrast with Hegelian creativeness, a term once negated returns to its old self (p. 278), though dialectic is present in the Taoist progression (p. 116) from "having-no knowledge" (= ignorance) to "having

no-knowledge" (= spiritual achievement after having knowledge). Further fresh facets are a comparison (yet distinction) between Chu Hsi's doctrines of *Li* and *Chi* and Plato's Theory of Ideas; the internationalism of the *Ta Hsüeh* (Great Learning); or Hsün Tzu's "three classes of fallacies" ("corrupting names with names, corrupting names with actualities, corrupting actualities with names"), somewhat in the mood of modern "analytic" thought (p. 153); and the value of the "School of Names" (*Ming chia*), partly similar to the Greek Sophists.

The wealth of Chinese thought is well displayed by Professor Fung. The "hundred schools" of the fifth to the third centuries B.C. were classified into six major schools by Ssu-ma T'an and into ten by Liu Hsin; the latter's attempt to trace the *origin* of the main schools has been revised by Professor Fung with a significant sociological sense (p. 37). Of further interest to the Western reader is the slant given on Buddhism: "The idea of the Universal Mind is a contribution of India to Chinese philosophy"; previously there was "only the mind, but not the Mind." Arresting, too, is his treatment of Zen: "Ch'anism, the Philosophy of Silence." In an appreciation of these problems is involved a quadrilateral of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Western trends.

As to the future, philosophy will take the place of a religion embarrassed by science; philosophy already satisfies the Chinese people's craving for the Beyond and for super-moral values — though surely they have also found a need for "religion," ritual, and superstition? How will contact with the West alter this? If Confucianists knew the concrete "measures and institutions," while Taoists knew the "underlying principle" (a Taoist view!), there is today a far more complex situation: *some* of the measures and something of the principle are known by both China and the West (and India). In his pregnant last chapter, Professor Fung stresses the value of Western "positive" thinking to complement Chinese "negative" thinking (though, surely, in some ways the West has been more negative or sceptical, e.g., as regards family, ancestors, etc.). But the whole of this chapter and its predecessor on Western philosophy in China (Dewey and Russell bewildered the Chinese by implying that all earlier Western thought had been superseded!) are too rich to be summarized here.

Thinking of Chinese actualities, may we not place hope in the "reversal movement of Tao," a traditional Chinese psychological consoler? "Those who do not delight in killing men would unify the world" (Mencius, quoted on p. 191).

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

Culture and Education. By LAWRENCE STENHOUSE. (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., London. 156 pp. 1967. 35*s*.)

Now that education and, particularly, teacher-training methods are "hot news" this book is of special interest, being written by the Principal Lecturer at the Jordanhill College of Education, one of the largest teacher-training colleges in the Commonwealth.

The whole is based on experience in the schools, both as a teacher and as Staff Tutor at the University of Durham, and many interesting examples of children's work and general conversation illuminate the argument.

A few chapter headings will serve to indicate the wide field covered: "The Nature of Culture," "Culture and the Mass," "Education and the Role of the Teacher," "The Education of the Ordinary Child," "The Training of Teachers."

As a primary teacher myself I was especially grateful to read: "In the primary school, there exists a coherent and well-developed progressive tradition ..." and "The child-centred teach-

er places the highest value on the child's ability to handle his experience." The author gives a very clear and comprehensive account of the progressive primary class and the usual happy relationship of pupil and teacher. He also gives a helpful analysis of the very different problems confronting the secondary-school teacher: "The teacher finds it extraordinarily difficult to face with equanimity the experience of the majority of adolescent pupils ... . Teenage culture ... is in its way a kind of protest."

Finally, the author gives a particularly helpful account of the main differences between what we may term the formal or traditional way of teaching and the "progressive" and "creative," and shows how the young teacher may best find his way to what is in the true interests of the child.

There is a helpful Bibliography, but, unfortunately, no Index.

ELIZABETH CROSS

Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya of ACARYA JINABHADRA: *With Auto-commentary*. Part I. Edited by DALSUKH MALVANIA (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series, No. 10. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Bharatiya Sanskriti Vidyamandira, Ahmedabad. viii+281 pp. 1966. Rs. 15.00)

Besides the fourteen *Pūrvas,* the eleven *Aṅgas,* the twelve *Upāṅgas,* the ten *Prakīrṇas,* six *Chedasūtras, Nāndī* and *Anuyogadvāra,* and four *Mūlasūtras,* there are a number of independent works like Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra* (A.D. 1–85) which give a systematic exposition of Jaina philosophy in Prakrit and Sanskrit. Among the important later Jaina works of this kind is the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadragaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa (*c.* A.D. 489–593). Three editions of this important text are already known; while two of these make available to us the commentaries of Maladhārī Hemacandra (ed. by Pandit Haragovindadasa, Yaśovijaya Jaina Granthamālā, Vīra Saṁvat 2441) and Koṭācārya (ed. by Sūri Śrī Ānandasāgarajī, published by Ṛṣabhadevajī Keśarimalji, Ratlam, 1936), the third, published by the Āgamodaya Samiti, Ahmedabad, in two parts, gives, along with the text, a Gujarati translation for the help of those who can use the Prakrit text only with its aid. The present edition presents, for the first time, the auto-commentary (*svopajñavṛtti*) on the work, based on a unique MS. deposited at the Saṅghavī Pāḍā Jaina Bhaṇḍāra at Patan. It is very corrupt but the editor, Pandit Dalsukh Malvania, has been helped by two commentaries on this *Vṛtti* in the very difficult task of arriving at correct readings and reconstructing a readable commentary on a very tough text on philosophy.

The book under review is very neatly got up. It is a pleasure to go through it, and the arrival of the next part, which is to contain also a good introduction to the work as a whole, is to be eagerly awaited. Pandit Malvania and the L. D. Institute of Indology at Ahmedabad are to be congratulated on this splendid edition of a work which would be of great interest to students of Jaina ontology in particular and Indian philosophy in general.

H. G. NARAHARI

The Epic of the Kings: Shah-Nama, *the National Epic of Persia*. By FERDOWSI. Translated by REUBEN LEVY. (Persian Heritage Series. UNESCO Collection of Representative Works. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. xxviii + 423 pp. 1967. 52*s*. 6*d*.)

Hard it is to overpraise the enlightened policy which shapes into Western form such treasures of Asian literature; both UNESCO and the consistently excellent translator must be warmly congratulated. Save in excerpts, and apart from derived poems like

Matthew Arnold's "Sohrab and Rustum" (here "Rostam"), the English-reading world has had little chance to become familiar with Persia's supreme "national" poem.

The useful prologue by the translator and editor tells us some needed details. The author's poetical name, Ferdowsi, means "paradisal"; he probably died between A.D. 1020 and 1025. A devout Muslim, he was able in his epic to portray history from the world's Creation to his country's conquest by the Arabs. Throughout the work is a bitter sense of the reality of strife; Ahrimān, the Evil One of Zoroastrian thought, is ever-present — and this forms one contrast with the in many ways comparable *Iliad*. The paradoxes in Ferdowsi's own character also help to create the kaleidoscopic tone of the vast epic, which yet "is bathed in a wondrous light."

Religion here, of course, is more solemn than in Homer, and Aeschylus would seem a fitter comparison for the many sublime religious touches (e.g., pp. 52, 161, 166, and above all the unique "Poet's Introduction" with its tale of the Creation). The poem opens, "In the name of the Lord of the Soul and of Wisdom," etc., and proceeds to a praise of Wisdom and then to the world's creation. Fire first arose, "shining; then the wind and the water came, above the dark earth." Man appears, "the key to all these close-linked things" vegetable and animal; "you were produced out of two worlds and nurtured in some respects to be a go-between." Sun and Moon are next portrayed, followed by Muhammad and his fair Companions. Both the "mythical" and the "historical" halves which divide the epic with a too obvious seam (p. xxv) stress certain typically Iranian features, such as the *Farr*, a royal "refulgence or 'nimbus' symbolizing Divine favour .... It had almost a physical character ... recognizable by beholders ... ." Jamshīd, who brought peace and absence of death for hundreds of years, lost his *Farr* through *hubris*. This is one of the archetypal figures of which the poem is full: Khosrow ("self-willed") is the name of two great monarchs; Rostam's characterization excels in depth and paradox; Zahhāk is the grotesque, irrational tyrant with his millennial years of terror; Kāva symbolizes the just proletarian protester; Faridun, "as beautiful as a slender cypress," is the ideal, compassionate king; Siyāvush, the Parsifal-like tragic youth; while Yazdegerd, the last of the Iranic line, whose sojourn with, and murder by, the poor miller form a marvellously effective penultimate chapter, is a figure of universal pathos. Sekandar (Alexander the Great) occupies two chapters, his adventures taking him to China and elsewhere. Remarkable, too, and Homeric, is the union of good and evil in almost every character: this helps to give the poem its continuous readability and verve.

On p. xix the translator well remarks on Ferdowsi's art in laments for fallen kings and heroes, and in descriptions of sunrise, no two of which are the same. I would add to these the impressive series of Dreams and their Interpretations (pp. 93, 252, 324, and above all 237–42).

This volume should form a part of every civilized world-thinking library.

TERENCE WHITE GERVAIS

W. Somerset Maugham. By M K. NAIK. (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman. 222 pp. 1966. $4.95)

Today fiction has become a victim of "anti-writing." A story can now mean a long monologue, or a series of disjointed paragraphs, or just a collection of epigrams. The last of the old-fashioned story-tellers was surely Somerset Maugham. We might quarrel with his motivations and the details of his craft. The fact remains, however, that he was a novelist and story-teller who could grip the reader by the power of

his narrative art. His very first novel, *Liza of Lambeth,* was a triumph; its blatant realism notwithstanding, Liza with her complex emotions struck the reader as real. Maugham's realism presently underwent a slow process of transformation in *Mrs. Craddock, Of Human Bondage,* and *The Moon and Sixpence,* and he almost perfected the art of the novel in *The Painted Veil, Cakes and Ale,* and *The Razor's Edge.* The cynicism of the earlier novels or the moral posturings of the later ones do not seriously affect the short stories, which are in a class apart, and his plays too achieved considerable success in his day. Because of the diffuseness of a novel and the limits imposed by the stage, Maugham's weaknesses are more apparent in these two *genres* than in the short story, which indeed brought out the best in Maugham. As Dr. M. K. Naik observes in his excellent critique of Maugham's works:

> No other English short-story-writer is as completely a citizen of the world as he is. There is God's plenty in the variety of scene and setting in his stories. And what a rich display of the many-sidedness of human character do those tales show! Maugham has a quick eye for human frailty, here as in his other works, but here he frequently admires, appreciates, understands, and pities. His sense of dramatic situation and of perfect construction and flawless form is also worthy of admiration. Suffice it to say here, these qualities are among some of the major excellences of his works. When all these are combined with deep sympathy and sincere emotion, we have such appealing and powerful stories as "Red," "Sanatorium," and "The Unconquered."

Dr. Naik's detailed analysis of Maugham's literary technique accentuates in some measure the reader's enjoyment of Maugham's art. Dr. Naik does not slur over Maugham's defects, and in fact makes pointed reference to Maugham's cynicism. Maugham could have transcended this cynicism by his humanitarian outlook; unfortunately he did not. He never became serene. Dr. Naik concludes rather sadly:

> He was a born story-teller, a keen judge of character, an able technician, and a shrewd observer of life with ample native sensibility. Travel furnished him with a vast and varied background. With all these advantages, Maugham developed merely into a very readable author, and little more. If tragedy is waste due to unrealized potentialities, Maugham's career may be given that name. One is tempted to describe his career almost as a tragedy with cynical indifference as the villain of the piece.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

With Profound Respects. By S. CHIDAMBARAM. (Higginbothams, Madras. 153 pp. 1967. Rs. 7.50)

The author had the unique privilege of serving the late Dr. Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar (1879–1966) as a private secretary for over fifty years. Thus he had many opportunities to watch his "Master" (as he so affectionately alludes to C.P. as) at close quarters and wonder at the many-sidedness of the latter's scintillating genius. These 170 anecdotes of his hero's life are consequently cameos, as it were, of C.P.'s versatile character, revealing him as a loving householder, a brilliant lawyer, a courageous member of a State's Executive Council, an outstanding and able administrator of a princely state, an acute politician, a true statesman, and a very understanding and considerate employer. The total impression, therefore, of Sir C. P. left on the mind of the reader is, "What a magnetic personality! What a rare and harmonious blending of wisdom and wit; vision and action; knowledge and humility; friendliness and fellow-feeling!"

With Profound Respects is, indeed, a delightful book. (But would not "With Profound Respect" have been a more suitable title? For, Respect, like Love, is an *immeasurable* emotion.)

GURDIAL MALLIK

A Handbook of Typography. By KAILAS TAKLE. (Nirmala Sadanand Publishers, Bombay. xii+120 pp. 1966. Rs. 15.00)

Shri Kailas Takle, typographer to J. Walter Thompson Company, Bombay, deserves praise for what is probably the first Indian work in full dress on the subject of typography, which is of vital importance to the printing and advertising professions. The *Handbook* sets out, briefly but comprehensively, background information about printing type such as the history of type, classification of typefaces, composing-room equipment, copy processing, typographic calculations, effective use of type, etc. Specimen lines of many standard typefaces are appended and these enable the beginner to acquaint himself with the characteristics of common typefaces as well as to form some notion of their visual impact or appeal, singly and in combination. Selection is by no means easy. The advertising boom of recent decades, which has made printing type an indispensable sales tool, and mechanical advances such as photo-composition, process-lettering, etc., which have liberated the type-designer from grave limitations that beset his predecessors, have resulted in the creation of countless new typefaces, and new variations of old ones. The third edition of Berry and Johnson's *Encyclopaedia of Typefaces* (1962) listed some two thousand typefaces.

The measure of a typographer's success depends on the degree of his appreciation of the temperaments and personalities of the types he has to deal with. Edwin Shaar, Art Director of Intertype Company, versified "in a type wag's moment of weakness":

> From announcing a tea to swaying the mob
> There's a typeface designed to foster the job.

Classification can always provide basis for argument. Tempo, given under Hebrew or Egyptian, should be classed under Sans-serifs. One wonders whether, from the design point of view, Scotch Roman (given here under Modern) and Perpetua (given under Twentieth-century Roman) are not predominantly Transitional in character. The Roman group could include a few other well-known typefaces like Janson, Caledonia, etc. Among the different names of Old English should be mentioned "Black-letter," extensively used in America. Sans-serif is no doubt "miscalled by many printers as Gothic" (p. 29). This is now, unfortunately, established usage in America, and refuses to be unsettled. One of the Sans-serif specimens given by the author (pp. 93, 110) is titled Gothic Fine.

We have somehow learnt to live with numerous anomalies of nomenclature. The American typefounders' Baskerville differs considerably from its British counterpart. The typeface called Verona (pp. 27, 89) is also produced by a leading British firm as Bologna; and Othello (p. 93) is almost indistinguishable from Neuland, designed by Rudolph Koch. Even in the use of weight notations — i.e., bold, extra-bold, heavy, etc. — there appear to be no agreed standards. Adrian Frutiger, a French designer of repute, desperately but perhaps very sensibly, employed a scheme of numbers to designate the various forms and weights of one of his typefaces.

These are, however, matters of academic interest. The generality of students of printing technology will find Shri Takle's book helpful and adequate for most purposes.

S. R. RAMASWAMY

BALDOON DHINGRA

Leaves from a Paris Diary

[Shri Baldoon Dhingra writes of the simple, firm philosophy of his friends the Aubauds, a couple who own a newspaper kiosk in Paris. — ED.]

FRANCE has always been and will continue to be a feminine society: *Ce que femme veut, Dieu le veut.* The figure most honoured is Jeanne d'Arc, and Marianne, too, represents France. The Anglo-Saxon countries have their masculine figures, Uncle Sam and John Bull.

When one wants to find a single word to define a particular country — and I have found this useful during my talks in different countries — I am reminded of what a well-known writer once said: Thought, an affectation for an Englishman, is a natural function for a Frenchman; a pleasure for the Italian; a speciality for a German; a vice in the Russian; and a torture for the Spaniard.

But the feminine spirit of France has often sought inspiration from a masculine culture, Spain. This is noticeable in many fields: in art and literature and in a good many of the figures that have inspired French literature. Many of these have come from Spain. Corneille and Hugo were among those who sought inspiration in Spain, so were Ravel and Debussy in music; even Bizet and Lalo. And Goya is the father of the nineteenth-century French school of painting as Picasso is of the twentieth century. In literature Montherlant and Camus have been fascinated by Spain.

Two figures, one from Spain and the other from Germany, seem to stand out today: Don Juan and Faust. They represent the battle between man and his desires, or, as they call it here, between God and the Devil. In the earlier versions both were defeated by the devil; in the later versions of Zorilla and Goethe both pass from selfish aims to self-giving love. From grasping to giving was once held to be an answer to our life's problems. The tendency, through papers, television, and the rest, is to help usher in the commercial age in which black magic and stone guests drag their hosts to hell. Both Faust and Don Juan were saved by women, by Gretchen and Doña Inez. They were saved because they loved.

It is to find out how two friends of mine, M. and Mme Aubaud, who own a newspaper kiosk in Avenue Niel, see things in Paris that I asked them a dozen or more questions.

It seems to be absolutely true that the extraordinary influence of strips, cartoons, and *romans-photos* is increasing. It reflects, according to Alice Aubaud, the Mephistophelean attitudes; destruction and domination as features of success, a kind of reversion to the primitive in us. But the Aubauds do not think these are old values but eternal ones; they are not impressed by the notions of progress with which so many bolster up their thoughts today.

To them life is neither a pleasure nor a calamity. It is a grave affair with which we are charged and which we must conduct and terminate with honour. To her the book of the world — the constant comings and goings of people — is full of knowledge, and she is aware of them. She watches things as a spectator would a play. M. Robert Aubaud believes there is a great mental laziness in people — more mental than physical. The magnifying of small things, the belittling of great ones, indicate mental exhaustion.

But I have always been told you are a logical people, I said. Surely, you are supposed to think too. Why, then, this sluggish habit? Can't people see through this?

"If by demonstrating the injuriousness of evil [M. Aubaud said] we could ensure the acceptance of good, a little logic would redeem mankind. No, reading or skimming through books and

pamphlets is growing each day. Without the vast compelling power of joy, the activities of men grow feverish.

The notion that we Frenchmen are a profound people, is not at all true; on the contrary, we are a superficial lot, really, thinking mostly of ourselves: the *après-moi-le-deluge* idea. Women as inspiration or ideals don't really exist. Instead of Marianne or Jeanne d'Arc, we have cover-girls. You can't sell a thing unless the usual lurid feminine symbol is there and this reflects an effeminate, not a feminine, culture. The boredom of Americanism, whatever they say to the contrary, is upon us.

Most French people age badly; they don't mellow with age; they are older and often more foolish."

"But you are a happy couple and have a fine, studious, intelligent son?" I said.

"We are always trying to study ourselves, watch ourselves, and with our son we look at things around us."

"What is your notion of good?"

"It is to be detached, to judge none."

"And of evil?"

"Why to criticize others and to wish them harm."

"Do you follow any religion?"

"No, not in the conventional sense."

"What in your opinion is the best French paper?"

"*Le Monde*. No one buys *Le Monde* except to read it. Many people buy *Le Figaro* or *L'Express* to show it around. But the success of the Turf is unbounded; everyone seems to put his money on horses, on buying cars he can't afford. We are non-conformists really and we preserve good-humoured tolerance towards the passers-by. We don't really have time to meet people for any length of time. But you know a sense of humour is a great peace-maker of the world."

But the French are better known for wit and irony than for humour . I could not help recalling the words of La Rochefoucauld: Next to the joy of the egoist is the joy of the detractor. This appeared very true to them; for they are often coming across women — too many, alas! said Madame Aubaud, who brighten up wonderfully under the beneficent influence of other people's misfortunes. Yet there are people — take the café-owner next door — who under the benign influence of coffee betrays now and then signs and tokens of fallibility.

The Aubauds are amused but not unduly impressed by all these great cosmonaut feats. People still seem to have a happy confidence in the perfectibility of human nature and no discouraging acquaintance with history to dim it.

"What is your idea of happiness?"

"Simple comforts, a natural healthy life — the woods, good music, plays, the chance to talk with friends, a tiny bit of leisure, a sharing in people's joys and pleasures. No television for us. Television, as we see it, has brought so much misery. People can't be by themselves. Imagine a couple on their honeymoon spending their time watching television."

There were many other things we talked about. Both Robert and Alice Aubaud have a knowledge of the world and of men and women, a lively and acute appreciation both of the becoming and the absurd. In a way both of them are social critics, but critics who have a considerable tolerance for people and things. This comes from a deal of good sense, consideration for others, and personal dignity.

Social criticism, as I see it, embraces those forgotten indices of civilization, tolerance, abnegation, and restraint. But there is very little social criticism in the real sense. Ideas, words, abstractions — these are the catchwords here. It is really a lost art, both in conversation and in writing. People do not seem to have time for such things as manners as deviations from good sense. Today social criticism has become a leaden-footed vagrant whose domain has been usurped by economics, sociology, science, and a type of ethics so highly personal that sanctions and standards know it no longer.

One has to have a philosophy of life if one is to be a social critic; or else one is a guide without sight, a warrior without arms, an exhorter without a voice. The Aubauds in their own way are remarkable observers and through their approach to so many problems, I find them aware, awake, and never disgruntled. In many ways, they have made me appreciate a number of things and they have shown me that it is still among the real workers of France that philosophy abides. In the Aubauds the two spirits, the masculine and the feminine, as complementary forces, are fully alive. It would be disastrous for France if Jeanne d'Arc failed to inspire. She does; and the King of the Machine, the super robot, is still far away.

BALDOON DHINGRA

Ends and Sayings

"... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

—SAMUEL BUTLER: *Hudibras*

Gordon Rattray Taylor, in his commentary "Focus" (*Science Journal*, April 1967), writes of a symposium held last spring, in which two speakers (Albert V. Crewe, till recently director of the Argonne National Laboratory, and Donald F. Hornig, Chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee) both made much the same point — that the government had failed to deal with problems such as air and water pollutions, transport, and crime, and needed more active help from scientists. Mr. Taylor is interested most in crime, particularly the relationship between unfavourable home circumstances and a social behaviour. He refers to cases where children cannot accept school discipline, since, at home, there is no care and control (their mothers live with a series of men), and their only object in life is mere "survival."

During World War II, the government found it necessary to instruct people in what was a sufficient diet, and to control the available foods (including fortifying with vitamins) so as to avoid deficiency diseases. Half a century before, it found it had to control sanitation if it wished to avoid the plague. How much worse does crime have to get before the government realizes that it will have to instruct people in how to bring up children, and have to control the social conditions and patterns which produce asocial personalities? Leaving the mess to the police to clear up is hardly a solution.

The natural functional pattern of society was, in ancient India, embodied in the ideal of the four castes. The later distorted and evil manifestations of caste do not invalidate their essential value. The *dharmas* (duties) of the four castes, respectively, are (1) to teach, not just information or technology, but wisdom; (2) to administer law and order, i.e., to protect the community, and to fight harm whether from within or without; (3) to balance right value and right payment, and meet the material needs of the community; (4) the labour on which rest the foundations of the whole. Education for living and the right adjustment of all relationships, social and political, are therefore the responsibility and function of the higher guiding group. With these should government be concerned, rather than the juggling with economic values and imbalances, with which governments are now so painfully involved. Because of the dominance of one func-

tion and deficiencies in the others, society is left vainly trying to "clear up the mess."

The value of extending public concern to the home situation is shown by the following (*The Guardian,* 17 April 1967):

> By attaching a full-time social worker to a Manchester secondary school with one of the highest delinquency rates in the city for an experimental period of three months, the truancy rate was cut by half and the number of children coming before the juvenile court reduced from 15 to none.

Such school welfare officers are far too few. It may be difficult to find the right type of person, but where should the priorities lie?

In July 1966 at a Geneva conference, sponsored by the World Council of Churches, the economist, Miss Barbara Ward, brought up the suggestion of global taxation to equalize conditions between the rich and the poor countries, and to get rid of the resentment felt by the latter. Miss Ward brought up the idea again in an ATV televised interview with Archbishop Keenan, 2 April 1967. She suggested a world tax of one per cent of national income, to be transferred from the rich to the poorer countries for education, housing, power, and agriculture. It would not reduce the present level of wealth for the affluent countries, but would merely slow down the increase in their incomes. The question of poverty should be tackled as a whole. She denied that the peoples of the poorer countries were especially lazy, and considered a policy of controlling family growth not yet essential. Mrs. Shirley Williams, Minister of State at the Department of Education and Science, at a Save the Children Fund conference (14 April 1967), also spoke of the eventual need for an international income tax to provide money needed to conquer world poverty.

Every scheme for betterment has, however, to concern itself not only with *what* is to be done, but also with *how* and *why*. Those who pay will need to be "educated" to see the real need; else there will be evasions, or conditions of self-interest attached, or totally unsuitable schemes imposed. Those who receive will also need "education" in right usage and in self-respect; if not, there will be irresponsible wastage, or "wangling" to get more than a fair share in the distribution. Such "education" must be moral — a word sadly out of fashion — as well as technical and scientific, if any material help, whether called "aid" or the resultant of world income tax, is to be a blessing, not a curse.

With the April 1967 issue *Blackwood's Magazine* marks its 150th anniversary. After some experimentation *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine* (its first title) settled down to its permanent aim, to provide "original, often first-hand, stories of work and play, humour and adventure, well-informed commentary on important events of the day and book reviews." Its notable list of contributors has included literary figures, government and service authorities, as well as "ordinary" people with some worth-while experience to relate. Its stories of travel are far removed from mere tourist tales.

The April 1967 issue contains, among other interesting features, "Gateway to the Moon," a weird experience in one of the "lost" valleys in the Andes of Peru, related by Jorge Macpherson, a railway electrician of mixed Scottish and Peruvian blood, to Brian Fawcett, the author, who has added other strange local episodes and beliefs contributed by a fellow railway worker and by Fawcett himself.

Fawcett instanced a weed — used, it was said, by the Incas to soften stones — that "ate" away the spurs of a man who, leaving his horse behind, took a short cut through a forest in which it

grew. Macpherson's experience with his father and friend, under the Huandoy peak of the Andes, was even more terrifying. They had camped alongside an impassable ravine for the night. Shortly after midnight — a clear night with no moon — they saw, resting on a rock in the ravine, a silvery luminous ball which then disappeared without trace. Thinking of radioactivity, and of the possibility of valuable minerals there, they made their way back some three or four kilometres to the entrance of the ravine, where the ground was covered knee-high with reddish-purple weeds. Their mules refused to advance, but the men went on, only to be painfully affected by poisonous exhalations from the plants. With intense difficulty they dragged themselves back to open ground, where they lay unconscious for forty-eight hours. Later they heard of another party, investigating "the deadly valley of the moon," which had never returned. Whether radium caused the phenomenon, or whether the Incas had planted the death-dealing weed to protect buried treasure, remain questions.

Many fields of discovery await attention, not merely geographical, but also scientific and historical. The knowledge of ancient cultures is not yet fully recognized. The Incas were the inheritors, not the creators of the stupendous pre-Inca structures, nor did they possess all the earlier skills. Today there is considerable interest in — and controversy about — the degree of sophisticated knowledge and constructional skill of the builders of Stonehenge.[1] The similar astronomical structures in the Americas, and in India as well, also merit investigation.[2]

An Old House

For centuries you've stood
In dignified solitude
Tenants have come and gone,
Now there are none,
Or so men say,
Yet as I hear the soft winds play
Around you where tree-shadows sway
Recalling vanished scenes
I hear the rustle of crinolines.

HERBERT BLUEN

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[1] Cf. "Ends and Sayings," THE ARYAN PATH, October 1966

[2] H. P. BLAVATSKY: "A Land of Mystery," in *The Theosophist*, March, April, June, August 1880; *The Theosophical Movement*, May, June, July, August 1943. Cf. H. P. BLAVATSKY's *Isis Unveiled*, I. 595-8, as to the Inca hidden treasure.